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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Outline, the Approach, and Important Terms 
Transnational companies (TNCs) have become some of the most powerful actors in the 
global society with significant impact on the enjoyment of human rights. While foreign 
investments and TNCs have the ability to have a very positive impact on human rights, 
such as through economic growth and increasing welfare, there is also another side to the 
issue. Abuses in corporate operations through, for instance, environmental disasters, 
inhumane working conditions, and use of child labor, have served as proof that companies 
are also able to cause massive violations of human rights.  
In this thesis I will examine how the corporate impact on human rights is regulated under 
international law, and how this regulation affects the enjoyment of human rights, especially 
the right to remedy. I shall do this by searching for answers to three questions. Firstly, I 
will examine who bears the responsibility under international law for human rights 
violations committed by a company. Secondly, I will identify the loopholes in the current 
international and national regulation due to which those responsible can escape liability. 
Finally, I will determine the consequences of these loopholes, especially in the light of the 
right to remedy. My conclusion is that there are significant loopholes in the current 
regulation of corporate operations under international law, and that together with 
inadequacies in the national legal systems, these loopholes have a notable impact on the 
human right to remedy. I will further argue that these loopholes should be closed, and that 
this would be done most efficiently through the establishment of an international legal 
framework through a multilateral treaty.  
I have examined the research question by studying the relevant sources of international 
law, as provided in the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ).1
                                                 
1 Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ Statute), adopted as an integral part of the Charter of the 
United Nations (adopted 26 June 1945, entry into force 24 October 1945), 1 UNTS xvi, art 38(1). 
 These include, 
as primary sources, international treaties, customary norms of international law, and 
general principles of international law. Further, as secondary sources, I have studied the 
“judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various 
nations”, including both scholarly material and decisions of international and national 
judicial organs. I have also taken note of soft law instruments, including voluntary 
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initiatives on corporate social responsibility, and resolutions and declarations of 
international organizations. 
My approach to the research question is twofold. On the one hand, I have taken a critical 
view of the issue, and questioned the ability of current regime of international law to face 
the challenges brought about by the reality of economic globalization, arguing that 
profound regulatory reform is needed. I have justified this view by searching the loopholes 
and inadequacies in the current regulation, and examined how they affect the enjoyment of 
human rights. On the other hand, the thesis is based on the firm ideological notion that 
human rights should always be protected as effectively as possible, against infringements 
by anyone. I thus give human rights priority over other values, such as economic interests. 
Due to the large amount of regulation and discussion on this field, certain outlines have 
had to be made. Firstly, I will focus on international hard law norms, as well as on the 
norms in certain national legislations which are relevant for the topic of this thesis. I have 
left out the discussion of the regulation within the European Union (EU), as well as the 
further examination of the international voluntary initiatives. Secondly, I will not discuss in 
detail the specifics of the regulation concerning the exercise of public powers by private 
companies or the outsourcing of public functions and duties, as there would be enough 
material for an entire thesis on this issue alone. I will therefore primarily examine the 
international regulation concerning private corporate operations, and only mention the 
regulation related to public activities whenever this is applicable also with respect to 
private corporate activities. 
Some terms to be used regularly in the course of the text may require further definition. 
TNCs for the purposes of this thesis are all those corporations, understood widely, whose 
activities in one way or another take place on the territory of two or more states. The field 
of industry, the exact relationship between entities within the group, the operations 
exercised in each entity, and the ownership of the companies therefore vary between TNCs 
understood in this way.2
                                                 
2 The term “transnational corporation” here is intended to be understood as widely as for instance the term 
“multinational enterprise” in the ILO Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy, according to which they “include enterprises, whether they are of public, 
mixed or private ownership, which own or control production, distribution, services or other facilities outside 
the country in which they are based. The degree of autonomy of entities within multinational enterprises in 
relation to each other varies widely from one such enterprise to another, depending on the nature of the links 
between such entities and their fields of activity and having regard to the great diversity in the form of 
 What is relevant is that the TNC has operations in more than one 
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state, whether those operations relate to managing, manufacturing, extraction or 
accounting. When particular legal issues relate, for instance, to a certain type of 
relationship between a parent company and its subsidiary, this is specifically explained in 
that context. However, some issues to be discussed in the thesis concern all corporations, 
not only TNCs, and when discussing these questions, I will merely use the term 
“corporation” or “company”. 
The term “home state” refers to the state within whose territory or jurisdiction the company 
or the company group is domiciled, whereas “host state” refers to the state within whose 
territory or jurisdiction the respective corporate activities are carried out, which in the 
context of TNCs often takes place through subsidiaries. 
 
1.2 The Structure  
I will start the thesis by discussing, in chapter 2, certain preliminary issues relevant to this 
topic. I will first discuss the conflict that exists between the factual power of TNCs and the 
way they are perceived in the system of international law as “just another non-state actor”. 
I will then have a brief overview of the different voluntary initiatives taken within the 
international community with the view of controlling the possible negative impact of 
TNCs. In this context, I will present critique expressed against such voluntary initiatives as 
the sole instrument to control corporate activities internationally.  
In chapter 3, I will turn to examine the international law provisions which are relevant for 
the purposes of regulating corporate conduct, or which have been put forward as possible 
sources of regulation. These include the customary norms of international law on state 
responsibility, the international and regional human rights treaties, international criminal 
law, customary international law related to human rights, and general principles of 
international law. In this chapter I will identify when and how responsibility for a 
company’s human right violation can be established, to whom the responsibility is 
                                                                                                                                                    
ownership, in the size, in the nature and location of the operations of the enterprises concerned”. See 
International Labour Office (Governing Body), ‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy’ (adopted November 1977, amended in November 2000 and in March 2006), 
para 6. 
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attributed, and what are the situations in which no one is held internationally responsible 
for the violation.  
In chapter 4 I will take a look at the challenges faced in the national legal systems when a 
human rights case against a company is brought before a national court. The national 
courts of the host state – and sometimes of the home state as well – are currently the only 
legal forums where a company can be held directly liable for human rights violations. The 
challenges faced within the host state and the home state of the company may lead to the 
impunity of the company, and can leave the victims of abuses without any chance to 
receive remedies.  
In chapter 5, I will consider the consequences of the loopholes identified in the previous 
chapters, and especially how they affect the human right to remedy. I will also argue how 
an international legal framework, in the form of a treaty establishing international 
obligations on both corporations and states, would improve the situation and help to close 
the regulatory gaps. Finally, I will take a look at the most recent developments within the 
United Nations (UN) and the EU to face the challenges caused by transnational corporate 
operations. 
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2 PRELIMINARY ISSUES: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
2.1 The Conflict of the Power of Corporations and Their Status Under 
International Law  
Public international law was originally created to regulate state relations, and states are still 
considered the main actors of public international law; after all, they are the actors who 
create international law by drafting and ratifying treaties and by forming international 
custom. They are not, however, the only relevant actors for the purposes of international 
law. Individuals and groups of individuals, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
international organizations and corporations can all affect the sphere in which international 
law is applied, from human rights to environmental issues.  
International legal personality means that an entity is a subject of international law, has the 
ability to possess international rights and duties, and has the capacity to bring international 
claims.3 Although the ability of individuals to have rights and duties under international 
law has long been recognized, the traditional state-centric view of international law has 
been visible in the reluctance of some scholars to accept that non-state entities could have 
international legal personality.4 The ICJ has found, however, that other actors than states 
may be subjects of international law and have international legal personality.5
                                                 
3 Reparations for Injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion) [1949] ICJ Rep 
174, p. 179. 
 Further, the 
ICJ has noted that legal persons are not identical in their nature and that the extent of their 
rights may differ, depending on “the needs of the community”, and to have legal 
4 Individual persons were prosecuted and held criminally responsible for war crimes and crimes against 
humanity committed during World War II before the military tribunals in the 1940’s, and the European 
Convention on Human Rights, for instance, entered into force in 1953. On the discussion of the status of non-
state entities briefly, see Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (OUP 2006), p. 
76-79.  
5 Reparations for Injuries, supra note 3, at p. 179; Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in 
Armed Conflict (Advisory Opinion) [1996] ICJ Rep 66, para 25; although these cases on the legal personality 
of non-state entities have concerned organizations created by states. See also James Crawford, ‘The System 
of International Responsibility’, in James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson (eds.), The Law of 
International Responsibility (Oxford Commentaries on International Law, Oxford University Press (OUP) 
2010), p. 18-19, where Crawford draws a distinction between international organizations and other non-state 
entities, noting that the existence of legal personality is less clear with respect to the latter. 
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personality does not mean that the entity in question would have the same rights and duties 
as a state.6
Today, there are multiple examples of international law regimes under which actors other 
than states have rights or duties. International organizations enjoy such privileges and 
immunities which are necessary for the exercise of their functions, and may even be held 
responsible for breaches of international law.
  
7 Individuals, as well as groups of individuals, 
have long enjoyed rights directly under international human rights law, and they can be 
held directly responsible for breaches of certain fundamental norms of international law, 
such as prohibitions of slavery, piracy, forced labor, genocide and war crimes.8 Further, 
individuals presumed to be involved in certain illegal acts, especially related to terrorism, 
may face targeted sanctions by the United Nations Security Council, such as asset freezes 
or travel bans.9
Within the system of international human rights law, the responsibility for human rights 
abuses occurring during the operations of non-state entities is sought indirectly through 
states. This approach derives from the classic state-centric understanding of international 
law and the idea that human rights need to be protected primarily against the states, who 
exercise exclusive authority within their jurisdiction. In such a situation, rights would be 
best guaranteed if the state was the one responsible for their protection against 
infringements by non-state actors.
  
10
The balance of power on the international plane has since shifted. While it is still plausible 
to claim that states are the primary actors under international law, the largest TNCs have 
 
                                                 
6 Reparations for Injuries, supra note 3, p. 179. Clapham argues that one should not try to “squeeze 
international actors into the state-like entities box” and that the focus should be in the rights and duties of 
non-state entities, not the theoretical question of their personality; Clapham 2006, supra note 4, at p. 80 and 
83.  
7 Reparations for Injuries, supra note 3, p. 180; see also Draft articles on the responsibility of international 
organizations, with commentaries, adopted by the International Law Commission (ILC) at its 63rd session 
(2011), submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the ILC’s report covering the work of that session (26 
April-3 June and 4 July-12 August 2011), UN Doc A/66/10. 
8 The ability of individuals to have rights was already recognized by the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1928; Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig (Advisory Opinion) [1928] PCIJ Series B no. 15, p 17-
18. For an overview of international criminal law, see part 3.3 below. 
9 Christian Tomuschat, ‘The Responsibility of Other Entities: Private Individuals’ in James Crawford, Alain 
Pellet, Simon Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (Oxford Commentaries on International 
Law, OUP 2010), p. 319. The sanctions against individuals are governed by Sanctions Committee, authorized 
by UN Security Council Resolutions; see eg. UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999) UN Doc S/RES/1267, 
concerning sanctions against Taliban members. 
10 See eg. Henry J. Steiner, ‘International Protection of Human Rights’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), 
International Law (2nd edition, OUP 2006), p. 772. 
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long time ago become highly influential as well. On the international plane, corporate 
power is visible in their participation and lobbying in the decision-making of international 
organizations, both by themselves and through the representation of interest groups.11 The 
economic power of TNCs compared with states has been demonstrated for instance by 
comparing the annual revenues of TNCs with the gross domestic products (GDP) of states, 
showing that the revenues of the largest TNCs in the world exceed the GDPs of several 
countries.12 Another, more concrete way of demonstrating the power of companies is 
simply to look at examples when a company has managed to influence the activities of the 
government of its host state, which ability often derives from the government’s need for 
foreign direct investment, or other economic dependence on the company. TNCs have had 
the power to pressure governments to act according to their will or to allow them to use 
questionable methods in their operations.13 Further, the operations of some TNCs, 
especially in the fields of product manufacturing and extraction in developing countries, 
have directly caused violations of human rights through environmental disasters, use of 
child or forced labor, exploitation of workforce, only to mention some issues.14
Despite their lack of duties, TNCs already have rights under international law. In the 
context of human rights, a company has even been allowed standing at a case before the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
  
15 Further, several direct investment treaties 
contain dispute settlement clauses according to which corporations are able to sue states at 
an arbitration tribunal, and the arbitrary awards that follow can be enforced against states.16
                                                 
11 See eg. Peter Muchlinski, ‘Multinational Enterprises as Actors in International Law: Creating ‘Soft Law’ 
Obligations and ‘Hard Law’ Rights’’, in Cedric Ryngaert and Math Noortmann (eds.), Non-State Actor 
Dynamics in International Law: From Law-Takers to Law-Makers (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, Surrey 2010), p. 
12-13. 
 
12 One comparison of this type was made by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) in 2000; see UNRISD, ‘Visible Hands: Taking Responsibility for Social Development, An 
UNRISD Report for Geneva 2000’ (UNRISD 2000), p. 77. 
13 See eg. Chu Yun Juliana Nam, ‘Competing for Foreign Investment through the Creation of Export 
Processing Zones: The impact on Human Rights’, in Olivier De Schutter (ed.), Transnational Corporations 
and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2006), p. 162-164. For a more detailed description of corporate-state 
relationship and the sources of corporate power, see Amnesty International, ‘Injustice Incorporated: 
Corporate Abuses and the Human Right to Remedy’ (Amnesty International Ltd, London 2014) p. 173-197. 
Evidence on a corporate pressuring governmental troop to repress protesters has been provided for instance 
in the litigation in US courts against Rio Tinto, concerning its operations in Papua New Guinea, and against 
Shell, concerning its extraction activities in Nigeria; see chapter 4.2, below.  
14 These are all examples of cases considered in US Courts under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), 
discussed in chapter 4.2.1, below. For examples of earlier cases of corporate-related human rights abuses, see 
eg. Celia Wells and Juanita Elias, ‘Catching the Conscience of the King: Corporate Players on the 
International Stage’, in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP 2005), p. 143-144. 
15 The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, application no. 6538/74 (ECtHR 26 April 1979). 
16 See eg. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States 
(adopted 18 March 1965, entry into force 14 October 1966) 575 UNTS 159, arts. 25 and 28; and Convention 
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Along with the economic impact caused by high awards, this has been claimed to cause a 
shift of sovereign power from states to TNCs, and to risk having negative impact for 
instance on human rights.17
Overall, it would seem justifiable to claim that TNCs are, indeed, active and powerful 
international players, sometimes at the same level with states with respect to economic 
influence and power. Despite this, so far international law has failed to address 
corporations as the powerful actors they are, and has instead treated them as “just another 
non-state actor”, with some rights but hardly any duties.
  
18 This creates a strange conflict: 
TNCs are real international actors, with real international rights and operations across the 
globe, but they do not have too many international obligations, leaving most of their global 
activities unregulated under international law.19
 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (adopted 10 June 1958, entry into force 7 
June 1959) 330 UNTS 3. See also Muchlinski in Ryngeart and Noortmann (eds.) 2010, supra note 11, p. 11. 
17 While these clauses were originally designed to protect corporations against nationalization and other 
inferences by the host state, recently it has been argued that in fact they have caused an arbitrary shift of 
power from states to TNCs, and have had negative impact on the sovereignty of the host states. For instance 
professor John Ruggie, the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, has raised the issue of imbalanced 
dispute settlement clauses as part of the challenge posed by international trade on human rights; see John 
Ruggie, ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy: The UN Framework for Business and Human Rights’, in  Manisuli 
Ssenyonjo and Mashood A. Baderin (eds), International Human Rights Law: Six Decades After the UDHR 
and Beyond (Ashgate Publishing 2010), p. 521. 
18 One such instance where a company has duties directly under international law is the procedure in the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber of the Law of the Sea Tribunal; see United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (adopted 10 December 1982, entry into force 16 November 1994) 1833 UNTS 3, arts. 187, 291; and 
Annex VI, Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, art. 20(2). For a critique of companies 
having rights but not duties, see eg. International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), ‘Beyond 
Voluntarism: Human rights and the developing international legal obligations of companies’ (ICHRP 2002), 
p. 12-13. Also Muchlinski has noted that this dichotomy of soft law obligations and hard law rights “is not a 
balanced regime as it favours binding investor protection without reciprocal binding norms”; see Muchlinski 
in Ryngaert and Noortmann (eds.) 2010, supra note 11, p. 9. 
19 As the Special Representative John Ruggie has noted, the governance gaps between the impact of 
economic actors and the ability of states to control them “provide the permissive environment for wrongful 
acts by companies of all kinds without adequate sanctioning or reparation”. See ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights, Report of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
John Ruggie’, 8th session of the Human Rights Council (7 April 2008), agenda item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/8/5 
(Report of the Special Representative Ruggie, 2008), para 3. 
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2.2 Soft Law Initiatives and Why They Are Not Enough  
2.2.1 A Short History of Voluntary Initiatives from the OECD Guidelines to the 
Ruggie Principles 
The response of the international community to the contradiction of corporate power and 
their legal status has so far come in the form of diverse voluntary corporate compliance 
initiatives. Since 1970’s, working groups mandated by international organizations have 
created guidelines and recommendations over how corporations should take human rights 
into account in their operations – that is, if they voluntarily agree to take them on their 
agenda. The initiatives impose corporations due diligence and reporting duties which the 
corporations may follow, and provide insight on what types of obligations transnational 
corporations might have with respect to human rights. 
The first international initiative was the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, drafted already in 1976 
as a part of the OECD Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises.20 The guidelines are, as the text notes, “recommendations addressed by 
governments to multinational enterprises”21 operating “within or from their territories”22.  
The guidelines contain recommendations with respect to human rights and rights of 
workers, environmental and health impacts of corporate operations, bribery and extortion, 
consumer rights and interests, research and development activities and intellectual property 
rights, competition and taxation. The observance of the Guidelines by companies is 
“voluntary and not legally enforceable”23. However, the guidelines impose the states a 
binding duty to implement them through the setting up of National Contact Points, which 
promote the Guidelines, handle “specific instances”, meaning complaints of non-
compliance of the guidelines, and provide annual reports to the Committee on International 
Investment and Multinational Enterprises.24
                                                 
20 The guidelines have since been reviewed five times, the latest in 2011. See The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), ‘Declaration on International Investment and Multinational 
Enterprises’ (adopted 21 June 1976, last reviewed 25 May 2011), Annex 1: ‘OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’. 
  
21 Ibid, Preface para 1. 
22 Ibid, art. I. 
23 Ibid, Preface para 1. 
24 Ibid; and Decision of the Council on the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (27 June 2000) 
C(2000)96/FINAL, amended on 25 May 2011 (C/MIN(2011)11/FINAL). 
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Soon after the adoption of the OECD Guidelines, the International Labor Organization 
(ILO) adopted, in 1977, the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises and Social Policy.25 The Declaration was adopted unanimously by the 
Governing Body of the ILO, where both the employers’ and workers’ organizations as well 
as states are represented.26 The Declaration requires all parties to it, including 
governments, workers’ and employers’ organizations and TNCs, to respect human rights 
and workers’ rights, as well as to respect the sovereignty and local laws of states.27 The 
specific provisions of the Tripartite Declaration relate to employment and its promotion, 
training, conditions of work and life, including prevention of child labor, and to industrial 
relations between employers and workers. After the adoption of the ILO Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in 1998, the Tripartite Declaration should be 
applied and interpreted with regard to the objectives of the 1998 Declaration.28 Similarly to 
the OECD Guidelines, the Tripartite Declaration is a non-binding instrument which sets 
out principles the parties “are recommended to observe on a voluntary basis”.29 ILO 
activities related to the implementation of the Declaration are mainly promotional, and 
surveys conducted every two-to-four years remain the primary follow-up procedure.30
The UN initiatives on corporate responsibility are more recent than those adopted within 
OECD and ILO. The first initiative within the UN was the Global Compact, initiated in 
1999 by the Secretary-General at the World Economic Forum,
  
31 which developed into a set 
of ten principles derived from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, and the UN Convention Against Corruption.32
                                                 
25 International Labour Office (Governing Body), ‘Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy’ (adopted 1977, amended in 2000 and 2006). 
 The Global 
26 The drafting process of the Tripartite Declaration has been considered to give the instrument a high moral 
significance; see De Schutter, ’The Challenge of Imposing Human Rights Norms on Corporate Activities’, in 
De Schutter (ed), Transnational Corporations and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2006), p. 6. 
27 Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, supra note 25, 
art. 8. Even when operating in a state which does not comply with its obligations under certain ILO 
Conventions and Recommendations, the parties to the Declaration should still “refer to them for guidance in 
their social policy”; see ibid, art. 9. 
28 Ibid, addendum II. 
29 Ibid, art. 7. 
30 See eg. International Labour Office (Governing Body) ‘Report of the Tripartite Ad Hoc Working Group on 
the Follow-up Mechanism of the MNE Declaration’ (313th Session 15–30 March 2012, ninth agenda item) 
GB.313/POL/9(Rev.). 
31 ‘Secretary-General Proposes Global Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, in Address to 
World Economic Forum in Davos’, UN press release SG/SM/6881 (1 February 1999). 
32 ‘The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact’ (UN Global Compact website), 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles (visited 22 January 2016). 
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Compact differs from the ILO and OECD initiatives in the sense that it is directed only to 
companies and other non-state entities, which can voluntarily adhere to it.33 Companies 
taking part in the initiative are required to “support and respect the protection of 
internationally proclaimed human rights” and to “make sure that they are not complicit in 
human rights abuses”.34 The Global Compact principles are rather vague in their wording, 
and the initiative primarily sets a framework for companies who wish to operate 
responsibly, and offers insight on what types of responsibility-related challenges 
companies may encounter and how they can tackle them. The follow-up takes place 
through the submission by member companies of annual “Communications of Progress”, 
in which the companies explain their “efforts to operate responsibly and support society”, 
and which are published on the initiative’s website.35
After the launching of the Global Compact, the corporate responsibility discussion 
continued within the UN. This led, in 2003, to the adoption of the “Norms on the 
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights” by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights.
  
36 The basic idea behind these Draft Norms, deriving from the wording of 
the UDHR, was that TNCs and other companies, as “organs of society”, had 
responsibilities in securing and promoting human rights “within their respective spheres of 
activity and influence”.37
                                                 
33 To join the Global Compact, a company is required to submit a letter of commitment by its management; 
see ‘What’s the commitment?’ (UN Global Compact website) 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/participation/join/commitment (visited 15 February 2016). 
 The Draft Norms included provisions on a wide range of issues, 
such as protection and respect of workers’ rights, non-discrimination, prevention of 
corruption, consumer rights and environmental protection, along with provisions on the 
implementation of the norms. They were rather vaguely formed and were criticized of 
being too unclear to be applied. At the same time, it was argued that the Draft Norms were 
too far-reaching and too ambitious and that they tried to impose TNCs obligations which 
34 ‘The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact’ (UN Global Compact website), supra note 32. 
35 ‘What’s the commitment?’, (UN Global Compact website), supra note 33.  
36 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights , ‘Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights’ (adopted 13 
August 2003) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (“UN Draft Norms 2003”). 
37 Ibid, preamble para 3 and principle A:1. 
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should be borne by the state only.38 Due to the various problems of the Draft Norms and 
the critique they faced, no action was taken to implement them.39
Despite the lack of support for the draft norms, the work within the UN continued. In 2005, 
Professor John Ruggie was appointed the Special Representative of the Secretary-General 
on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises. 
His task was to “identify and clarify standards of corporate responsibility and 
accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to 
human rights”; to consider the role of states in this respect; to clarify concepts such as 
“complicity” and “sphere of influence” in this context; to “develop materials and 
methodologies for undertaking human rights impact assessments”; and to compare the best 
practices of both states and corporations on this area.
  
40 In 2008, the Special Representative 
gave a report, in which he laid out “a conceptual and policy framework” on the issue, 
which was based on three principles: the state duty to protect human rights, the corporate 
responsibility to respect them, and the importance of an effective access to remedy.41  In 
order to operationalize and to elaborate on this “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework, 
the Special Representative’s mandate was extended to continue until 2011.42 In 2011, the 
Special Representative submitted his final report, which included the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, intended to provide insight on the implementation of the 
tripartite framework.43 The Human Rights Council (HRC) unanimously endorsed the 
report and the principles and appointed a working group to promote their 
implementation.44
As noted in the introduction to the UN Guiding Principles, they are not intended to be 
legally binding, but instead to elaborate “the implications of existing standards and 
  
                                                 
38 For an overview of the discussion on the Draft Norms, see De Schutter in De Schutter (ed.) 2006, supra 
note 26, p. 18-21. 
39 UN Commission on Human Rights, Decision 2004/116 (20 April 2004) UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/116. 
40 UN Commission on Human Rights, Resolution 2005/69 ‘Human rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises’ (adopted 20 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/69, para 1.  
41 Report of the Special Representative Ruggie, 2008, supra note 19, Summary para 1. 
42 Human Rights Council (HRC) Res 8/7 ‘Mandate of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (adopted 18 June 
2008) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/8/7. 
43‘Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie: Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’’, Human 
Rights Council 17th session (21 March 2011) agenda item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (“Report of the Special 
Representative Ruggie, 2011”). 
44 HRC Res 17/4 ‘Human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (6 July 2011) 
UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/4, paras 1 and 6. 
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practices for States and businesses”, to create “a single, logically coherent and 
comprehensive template” of these standards and practices, and to identify the shortcomings 
of the current regime and the potential improvements.45 The principles are divided in three 
parts in accordance with the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” framework. The provisions 
concerning state duty to protect have been expanded from those of current international 
law regime to include the duty to regulate also the overseas operations of businesses 
domiciled within their territory or jurisdiction.46 The Guiding Principles also include 
“operational principles” on how the state duty should be fulfilled.47 Special principles are 
laid down with respect to state-owned or controlled businesses and businesses directly 
regulated by national laws, human rights promotion in procurement, supporting corporate 
respect for human rights on conflict zones, and coherence of state policies with the 
principles within both national and international institutions.48
The second part of the principles consists of provisions on the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights, which means that corporations “should avoid infringing on the 
human rights of others and should address adverse human rights impacts with which they 
are involved”.
  
49 The responsibility requires all companies, “regardless of their size, sector, 
operational context, ownership and structure”, to both “avoid causing or contributing to 
adverse human rights impacts” and to address such impacts in their own operations, and to 
“seek to prevent or mitigate” adverse impacts linked to the operations of their business 
relationships.50 Corporations should make policy commitments on the respect for human 
rights and have due diligence and remediation processes in place to prevent, mitigate and 
provide remedies for abuses.51
The final part of the principles concerns access to remedy, and the principles in this part 
are primarily focused on the duty of the state to provide access to effective remedy as part 
  
                                                 
45 Report of the Special Representative 2011, supra note 43, para 14. 
46 Report of the Special Representative 2011, supra note 43, Annex ‘Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’ (“the UN 
Guiding Principles”), principle 2. 
47 Ibid, principle 3. 
48 Ibid, principles 4-10. 
49 Ibid, principle 11. The human rights to be respected are, at the minimum, those laid down in the 
International Bill of Human Rights and the fundamental rights set forth in the International Labour 
Organization’s Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work; see ibid, principle 12. The 
corporation should seek to respect these rights also when it operates in a country where the risk of becoming 
complicit in human rights violations is higher; see ibid, principle 23. 
50 Ibid, principles 13 and 14. 
51 Ibid, principles 15-24. Corporations should also consider human rights risks as a legal compliance issue, 
regardless of where they operate. 
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of the duty to protect against abuses.52 They include recommendations on both state-based 
and non-state-based, and both judicial and non-judicial remedies. The principles also 
include recommendations for corporations on the establishment of their own effective 
grievance mechanisms.53 The principles lay down effectiveness criteria for non-judicial 
mechanisms, which include requirements of legitimacy, accessibility, predictability, 
equitability, transparency, rights-compatibility, and that the mechanism is “a source of 
continuous learning”.54
While the Guiding Principles are not binding as such and do not create any new 
international norms, they have significantly contributed to the work on business and human 
rights by creating a framework for addressing the question of corporate responsibility for 
human rights. Of the voluntary initiatives so far, they seem to be the most promising basis 
for the future work on the issue.  
 
 
2.2.2 Critique Against Soft Law Initiatives 
Why, then, should the work on the corporate responsibility for human rights continue? 
After all, the lack of binding legal obligations on the international level does not mean that 
corporations are not regulated at all; regardless of international corporate regulation, states 
still have the obligation to protect individuals against abuses by third parties. Regulation of 
corporate activities should therefore already take place within national legal systems. If 
more rules are needed, why should they not come in the form of these non-binding 
recommendations, which are more flexible than legal norms and which are better able to 
take into account corporate reality? Indeed, several commentators have noted that 
corporations are more committed to voluntary codes of conduct to which they themselves 
have adhered. It has also been suggested that these types of mechanisms, as they are 
developed and adopted by more and more companies, could best contribute to the 
achievement of responsible corporate operations.55
                                                 
52 Ibid, principle 25. 
 In the next two chapters, I will address 
the challenges of current hard law regulation of corporations, both on the international and 
national plane. Before that, I will address here the problems of soft law mechanisms and 
53 Ibid, principle 29. 
54 Ibid, principle 31. 
55 On the “voluntary versus mandatory” discussion, see Jennifer A. Zerk, Multinationals and Corporate 
Social Responsibility: Limitations and Opportunities in International Law (Cambridge University Press 
(CUP) 2006), p. 32-36. 
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explain why these initiatives, although they contribute to positive change, are not sufficient 
on their own to regulate corporate conduct, and how a binding regulation could be an 
advantage to the companies themselves.   
Under international law, “soft law” is a general term used to define non-legally binding 
instruments, such as declarations, resolutions, recommendations, and guidelines.56 These 
instruments have certain advantages to them, including their flexibility, and the fact that 
when accepting soft law instrument, states can avoid national ratification processes 
required by treaties. Also, as the consequences of non-compliance of soft law instruments 
are very limited, states are more likely to find an agreement on their content, and to agree 
on more detailed provisions.57 Due to their advantages, soft law instruments can be utilized 
for instance in the drafting process of a new multilateral treaty, as a first step towards an 
agreement.58 Further, soft law instruments may be of importance in determining existing 
norms of international law. Especially those instruments with a significant number of 
adhering states can be evidence of emerging or existing norms of customary law if they 
indicate state practice or opinio juris.59 Soft law instruments can also be used to 
authoritatively interpret treaty norms,60 or they can be considered as codifications of 
general principles of law.61
On the other hand, the binding force of a treaty may be necessary when establishing 
entirely new duties or otherwise inducing significant changes in international legal order.
 
62
In the context of TNCs and human rights, the International Council on Human Rights 
Policy (ICHRP), a non-profit expert organization consisting of highly qualified scholars 
and other experts of international law and human rights, has summarized the main 
problems of soft law instruments.
 
This is most certainly the case when establishing human rights duties on companies under 
international law. While soft law can be helpful especially in the beginning of the drafting 
process of such a treaty, it may not form sufficient regulation on its own.  
63
                                                 
56 Alan Boyle, ‘Soft Law in International Law Making’, in Malcolm D. Evans (ed.), International Law (2nd 
edition, OUP 2006), p. 142-143. 
 Firstly, the ICHRP challenges the alleged effectiveness 
57 Ibid, p. 144. 
58 Ibid, 145. 
59 Ibid, p. 145 and 153; see also ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art 38(1). 
60 Boyle in Evans (ed.) 2006, supra note 56, p. 146. 
61 Ibid, p. 151. 
62 Ibid, p. 155-156 
63 See ICHRP 2002, supra note 18, at p. 7-13.  
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of the voluntary codes. As the acceptance of voluntary codes is, by definition, voluntary, 
their effectivity in the first place relies entirely on whether companies adopt them or not. 
Even when the voluntary codes are accepted by companies, in the lack of real enforcement 
measures there are no means to ensure that the companies act accordingly.64 As a concrete 
example, the ICHRP notes that since the introduction of different voluntary codes, the 
amount of reported human rights abuses has not decreased, but increased. While it is 
difficult to reliably measure compliance, and the effects of voluntary initiatives may show 
only after some time has passed, it is clear that the voluntary initiatives have not been able 
to prevent human rights abuses or to facilitate their remediation.65 Further, market forces 
have not been proven the most efficient way to regulate corporate conduct, since “human 
rights are not always good for business”, and human rights issues can be difficult to 
regulate on entirely market-based mechanisms.66
Another critique by the ICHRP relates to the growing power of corporations and to the 
idea that this power should be controlled by law. Comparing the power of corporations to 
that of states, the ICHRP notes that “law is not and should not be static”, but instead should 
evolve to take into account the changing power structures of the society and seek to 
prevent impunity.
  
67
                                                 
64 Without effective enforcement, even requirements based on legislation may be ineffective. As an example, 
within the United States, Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(H.R.4173) requires US-based companies to report whether conflict minerals originating from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo or its adjoining countries are used in their products. Civil society has 
however noted that while some companies make the effort to source conflict free minerals, the majority of 
the due diligence reports submitted by the companies in 2014 were inadequate and did not meet the legal 
requirements. See Amnesty International and Global Witness, ‘Digging for Transparency: How U.S. 
companies are only scratching the surface of conflict minerals reporting’ (2015), available at 
https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/conflict-minerals/digging-transparency, last visited 6 March 
2016.  
 The ICHRP also notes the importance of legal enforcement measures, 
both in the light of its deterrent effect and the rights of victims. With respect to the latter, 
access to remedies by victims in the voluntary initiatives depends entirely on the “good 
65 ICHRP 2002, supra note 18, p. 7. As an example, Royal Dutch Shell plc has been part of the Global 
Compact initiative since 2000; yet, claims of the negative impact on human rights and environment have 
continuously been filed years after its adoption of the initiative principles. Similarly, although a member of 
the Global Compact since 2001, Nestlé currently faces lawsuit in a US court initiated in 2005 for the reported 
use of child labor on cocoa farms in Côte d’Ivoire. For an overview of these and other cases in US courts, see 
chapter 4.3 below. The list of Global Compact participants and the date of their adherence is available at the 
initiative website, ‘Our Participants’ (Global Compact website) https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-
gc/participants, last visited 6 March 2016.  
66 ICHRP 2002, supra note 18, p. 8. One might also question the effectiveness of the voluntary initiatives in 
the light of the critique expressed against binding regulation by those claiming that voluntary initiatives are 
sufficient to regulate corporate conduct. If the voluntary initiatives and rules have, indeed, proven so 
effective in ensuring respect for human rights, why would a set of similar but binding norms be harmful to 
business? 
67 Ibid, p. 9-10. 
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intentions” of the company, and the mechanisms available are not guaranteed to be 
transparent or consistent. Further, the ICHRP notes that legal enforcement through court 
proceedings is likely to have a more deterrent effect than non-judicial mechanisms, which 
cannot find the wrongs to be illegal, but only to be against the company’s own code of 
conduct.68
The ICHRP notes that binding regulation might be valuable also for companies seeking to 
act in a responsible manner. As long as there are no binding duties and enforceable 
sanctions for non-compliance, companies wishing to act “morally” may face disadvantages 
compared to those companies opting out of voluntary codes or paying no respect to the 
provisions of the codes.
 
69 Similarly, the less-committed companies can abuse the vague 
wording and unclear scope of codes of conduct, while even the best company codes can be 
hard to defend against criticism. A binding set of norms would clarify the obligations of 
corporations and help them to respond to criticism, and companies exceeding their legal 
obligations would have a baseline for measuring their achievements.70
Finally, it must be noted that the voluntary codes have also had a positive impact on 
corporate accountability. Although they are not very likely to become binding hard law 
norms any time soon, they have contributed to the development of the idea that companies 
should respect human rights and be responsible for the social impact of their operations.
 
71 
The voluntary codes have also brought the issue of business and human rights into public 
debate and have supported the calls for companies to act in accordance with the codes they 
have adopted. In the event that a set of binding international norms on corporate 
responsibility would be adopted at some point in the future, the voluntary initiatives still 
remain a valuable source of complementary regulation, as they offer a chance for extra 
contribution for those companies willing to take their accountability beyond the minimum 
requirements of binding regulation.72
                                                 
68 Ibid, p. 10-11. 
  
69 Ibid, p. 18-19. The ICHRP mentions as an example the drafting of the international anti-corruption treaties, 
in which the US companies faced with restrictions from the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act supported the 
drafting of internationally binding treaties. 
70 Ibid, p. 19. 
71 For instance Tomuschat has expressed doubts of these voluntary soft law instruments turning to hard law; 
see Tomuschat in Crawford, Pellet, Olleson (eds.) 2010, supra note 9, p. 328. 
72 ICHRP 2002, supra note 18, p. 9. 
18 
 
 
 
3 INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF CORPORATE ACTIVITIES AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
In this chapter, I will summarize the key aspects of hard law norms on corporate activities 
under international law. Under international law, responsibility for human rights lies 
primarily, and almost exclusively, on states, who are expected to protect the rights of 
individuals against infringements within their jurisdiction. Due to limits of state 
responsibilities both under the customary law and international human rights treaties, the 
main responsibility for protecting human rights under international law falls on the host 
state of corporate activities, although recommendations to the contrary have recently been 
expressed as well.  
 
3.1 Customary Law Norms on Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
3.1.1 General 
The general rules concerning state responsibility for violations of international law are 
found in the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (ARSIWA),73 which codifies the rules of 
customary international law concerning state responsibility.74
The rules codified in the ARSIWA are secondary norms of international law, which 
provide rules for determining how and when the responsibility of a state for an 
internationally wrongful act can arise and what are the consequences for such violation.
 While the ARSIWA 
concerns the responsibility of states, it is relevant with respect to corporate activities as 
well, due to the provisions concerning attribution and the breach of an international 
obligation.  
75
                                                 
73 International Law Commission (ILC), ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts (2001)’ (ARSIWA), submitted to the UN General Assembly as part of the Report of the 
International Law Commission on the work of its 53rd session (23 April–1 June and 2 July–10 August 2001) 
UN Doc A/56/10, with commentaries on the articles. The General Assembly included the articles in 
Resolution 56/83, ‘Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts’ (28 January 2002) UN Doc 
A/RES/56/83. 
 
This is defined for instance by the rules concerning attribution of action to a state and the 
74 ARSIWA, ibid, general commentary, para 1. 
75 Ibid. 
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definition of an internationally wrongful act in general, as well as the rules concerning 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness. The secondary norms are intended to remain 
neutral with respect to the primary norms of international law, which provide the content 
and scope of the rights and obligations of states.76
According to ARSIWA article 1, ‘every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State’.
  
77 The elements of an internationally wrongful act 
are described in article 2, according to which ‘there is an internationally wrongful act of a 
State when conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the State 
under international law; and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the 
State’.78
 
 Thus, in order to hold a state responsible for certain conduct, two elements are 
necessary: attribution of a conduct to the state, and the existence of a breach of an 
international obligation.  
3.1.2 Attribution 
States, as all other abstract entities, can only act through the conduct of individuals.79 
Whether and when such conduct can raise the responsibility of the state depends on the 
rules of attribution, described in articles 4-11 of ARSIWA. As the ILC has noted in its 
commentaries on ARSIWA, “the general rule is that the only conduct attributed to the 
State at the international level is that of its organs of government, or of others who have 
acted under the direction, instigation or control of those organs, i.e. as agents of the 
State”.80 Such instances are described in draft articles 4-11. Firstly, conduct is attributable 
to a state when it is committed by any state organ,81 or a person or an entity exercising 
elements of governmental authority,82 when the organ, person or entity is acting in their 
official capacity.83
                                                 
76 This distinction between primary and secondary norms is not always clear-cut, and sometimes secondary 
and primary norms seem to overlap, such as in the case of circumstances precluding wrongfulness; Eric 
David, ‘Primary and Secondary Rules’ in James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson (eds.), The Law of 
International Responsibility (Oxford Commentaries on International Law, OUP 2010), p. 29-33.  
 The same applies also with respect to organs placed at the disposal of a 
77ARSIWA, supra note 73, art. 1. 
78 Ibid, art. 2. 
79 James Crawford and Simon Olleson, ‘The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility’, in Malcolm 
D. Evans (ed.) International Law (2nd edition, OUP 2006), p. 460. 
80 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on chapter II, para 2. 
81 Ibid, art. 4(1) 
82 Ibid, art. 5. 
83 Ibid, art. 7. 
20 
 
 
 
state by another state.84  Also, the conduct of a person or a group acting on the instructions 
of, or under the direction or control of a state are attributable to that state.85 Further, in the 
absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the 
exercise of those elements of authority, when a person or a group is exercising elements of 
the governmental authority, their conduct is attributable to the state.86 Finally, conduct is 
attributable to a state, regardless of other circumstances, if and to the extent that the state 
acknowledges and adopts the conduct as its own.87
With respect to attribution and corporate conduct, the most relevant provisions are found in 
ARSIWA articles 5 and 8. Article 5 concerns the conduct of a person or an entity 
empowered by the internal law of the state to exercise elements of governmental authority. 
Article 5 could be applied with respect to activities of a private company for instance when 
a state had outsourced its public security tasks to a private firm and this arrangement was 
based on the internal legislation of the state.
    
88 For the purposes of this study, however, it is 
not necessary to further examine this provision, for it only concerns entities conducting 
“functions of a public character normally exercised by State organs” and this conduct 
“relates to the exercise of the governmental authority concerned”.89 The activities meant 
under article 5, whether taken by persons or entities, are comparable to those taken by state 
organs. I have left such public functions outside the sphere of this thesis.90
Article 8, instead, concerns the conduct of a private person or a group of persons acting 
either on the instructions of or under the direction and control of the state.
 
91 Compared to 
article 5, the main difference in article 8 is that it does not concern the exercise of 
governmental authority, and the conduct is not based on the internal law of the state.92 
Thus, the provisions codified in article 8 close some of the loopholes of other provisions on 
attribution (especially the one codified in article 5) and make clear that states “are not 
allowed on the one hand to act de facto through individuals and on the other to disassociate 
themselves from such conduct when these individuals breach international law”.93
                                                 
84 Ibid, art. 6. 
 While 
85 Ibid, art. 8. 
86 Ibid, art. 9. 
87 Ibid, art. 11. 
88 Such an example is also given in ARSIWA commentaries; see p. 43. 
89 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on article 5, para 2. 
90 See chapter 1.1, above. 
91 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on art. 8, para 1.  
92 Ibid, p. 47.  
93 Prosecutor v. Duško Tadić (Appeals Chamber Judgment) IT-94-1-A (15 July 1999) (“Tadić”), para 117. 
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the application of article 8 is often considered mainly in the context of armed conflicts, 
such as when a state has given assistance or instructions to armed groups which are not 
part of its armed forces,94 the article is by no means limited to such situations. In fact, the 
ARSIWA Commentary specifically mentions state-owned companies in connection with 
article 8.95
The attribution of conduct to a state under article 8 requires the existence of “a real link” 
between the state and those performing the conduct.
  
96 With respect to instructions, this 
requirement is fulfilled for instance when the state has recruited or instigated private 
persons, who remain outside governmental structures, to supplement state actions as 
“auxiliaries”.97 With respect to direction or control, the attributable conduct is required to 
be “an integral part” of an operation which was directed or controlled by the state. The 
sufficient degree of control depends on the particular situation and the case law has varied 
in this respect from the requirement of “effective control” in Nicaragua98 to the lower 
threshold of “overall control” in the decision of Appeals Chamber of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Tadić.99 With respect to unauthorized 
conduct, the deciding factor is whether the conduct “was really incidental to the mission or 
clearly went beyond it”.100
The threshold for attributing conduct of a state-owned company to a state under this 
provision is quite high. The mere establishment and ownership of a company by a state 
does not in itself create the “real link” required for attribution. Instead, international law 
“acknowledges the general separateness of corporate entities at the national level”, and 
thus usually does not allow the lifting of the “corporate veil”. This means that as long as 
companies enjoy separate legal personality under the internal law of the state, they are 
principally treated as entities separate from the state. However, the “corporate veil” might 
be lifted if it was used as a “mere device or a vehicle for fraud” or for evasion of 
responsibility, or when the state would use its ownership interest in or control of a 
  
                                                 
94 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Merits) [1986] ICJ 
Rep 14 (“Nicaragua”); and Tadić, ibid, para 120. 
95 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on art. 8, para 6. 
96 Ibid, commentary on art. 8, para 1. 
97 Ibid, commentary on art. 8, para 2. 
98 Nicaragua, supra note 94, p. 65, para 115. 
99 Tadić, supra note 93, para 120. See also Crawford and Olleson in Evans (ed.) 2006, supra note 79, p. 462, 
elaborating on the distinction between Nicaragua and Tadić. 
100 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on art. 8, para 8. On the other hand, the text of the same paragraph 
(8) suggests a different view when the conduct is performed under the effective control of the state, in which 
case “the condition for attribution will still be met even if particular instructions may have been ignored”. 
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company in order to achieve a particular result.101 As an example of the latter situation, the 
monitoring body to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)102, 
the Human Rights Committee (CCPR), considered in Hertzberg et al v. Finland that 
Finland was responsible for the actions of the Finnish Broadcasting Company, as the state 
held a dominant stake (90 per cent) in the company and the company was “placed under 
specific governmental control”.103
 
 
3.1.3 Breach of an International Obligation 
The provisions concerning the breach of an international obligation are codified in chapter 
III of ARSIWA, in articles 12-15. Article 12 defines the breach of an international 
obligation by a state as an act of the state that is not in conformity with what is required of 
it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character. Thus, as noted in the commentary 
to the articles, the existence of a breach of an international obligation depends on the 
“precise terms” of the obligation, the way it is interpreted and applied, and what is the 
object and purpose of the obligation.104
An international obligation for the purposes of articles 2(b) and 12 of ARSIWA may arise 
from any source of international law, that is, from a treaty provision binding on the state, a 
customary law norm, or a general principle of international law. The source of the 
obligation is irrelevant in the context of state responsibility, as these rules apply similarly 
regardless of where the obligation derives from.
 These are issues not to be determined by the law of 
state responsibility, but by the primary norms in question. 
105 The obligation may be owed to one 
state, to several states or to the international community as a whole.106
                                                 
101 Ibid, commentary on art. 8, para 6; see also Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited 
(“Barcelona Traction”), [1970] ICJ Rep 3, paras. 56–58. 
 Further, the 
102 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (adopted 16 December 1966, entry into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171. 
103 Hertzberg et al. v. Finland, Communication No. R.14/61 (2 April 1982) UN Doc A/37/40, Supp. No. 40, 
annex XIV, p. 161, para 9.1.  
104 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on art. 12, para 1. See also Crawford and Olleson in Evans (ed.) 
2006, supra note 79, p. 454-455, noting that while international states vary from state to state, the norms on 
state responsibility are “general in character”. 
105 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on art. 12, paras 3 and 4; see also Case concerning the difference 
between New Zealand and France concerning the interpretation or application of two agreements, concluded 
on 9 July 1986 between the two States and which related to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior 
Affair (30 April 1990), XX UNRIAA 215 (“Rainbow Warrior”), para 75. 
106 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on art. 12, para 6. The concept of an obligation “owed to the 
international community as a whole”, also known as an “obligation erga omnes”, was first applied by the ICJ 
in Barcelona Traction case and later also in eg. East Timor case and Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion; see 
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international obligation may require certain type of conduct (“obligation of conduct”) or a 
certain result to be achieved (“obligation of result”).107
Breach of an international obligation may involve an act or an omission or a combination 
of the two, depending on what is required of the state by the obligation in question.
 
108 For 
instance, in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, the inaction of the 
Iranian authorities in the face of the attacks against the embassy of the United States 
“entailed clear and serious breaches of its obligations” under conventions concerning 
consular relations.109
 
 In the context of human rights, the failure of a state to fulfill its 
positive obligations to protect and to promote human rights would be a breach of its 
international obligation under the human rights treaties. 
3.2 International Human Rights Treaties: Positive Obligations of States 
Under international human rights treaties, states are obliged not only to refrain from 
violating human rights, but also to take measures to ensure the protection and fulfillment of 
human rights to everyone within their jurisdiction.110 States’ positive obligations, requiring 
actual measures to be taken, include for instance the obligation to adopt legislative and 
other measures which are necessary for the fulfillment of rights,111 and the obligation to 
ensure an effective remedy if any violations occur.112
                                                                                                                                                    
Barcelona Traction, supra note 
 The positive obligations of states 
101, paras 33-34; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia) [1995] ICJ Rep 90, para 
29; and Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, (Advisory 
Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, paras 155-157. 
107 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on art. 12, para 11; however, as the ILC notes in the commentary, 
the distinction between obligations of conduct and result is not exclusive, and in some circumstances they 
both might be included in the same obligation. 
108 Ibid, commentary on art. 12, para 2. As an example, as will be described in the next chapter, most human 
rights treaties bring upon states not only negative obligations (to refrain from human rights violations) but 
also positive ones (to ensure that individuals can enjoy their rights and even to prevent human rights 
violations committed by third parties). 
109 United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran [1980] ICJ Rep 3, para 67. 
110 Even when drafting the norms on the responsibility of corporations for respecting human rights, the 
primary obligation of states to protect these rights has been affirmed; see UN Draft Norms 2003, supra note 
36, preamble para 3 and art. A(1).  
111 See, for instance, ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 2(2); International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (adopted 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art. 
2(2).  
112 ICCPR, supra note 102, art 2(3); UNGA Res 217 A (III), ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
(UDHR) (10 December 1948) UN Doc A/RES/3/217 A, art. 8. See also CCPR, ‘General Comment No. 31: 
The Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant’ (26 May 2004) UN 
Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13, paras 15-16. 
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includes the obligation of the state to take measures to protect individuals against the 
violations by private entities, including corporations.  
Transnational corporations may affect the enjoyment of several human rights provisions 
both in their role as employers and as members of the society.113
 
 These provisions include, 
among others, the prohibition of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, prohibition of slavery and forced or compulsory labor, right to respect for 
private and family life, home and correspondence, freedom of expression and freedom of 
association, right to the enjoyment of just and favorable conditions of work, right to form 
and join trade unions and the right of the unions to function freely, and the right to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health. 
3.2.1 Jurisdictional Issues  
In order to determine whether a state is responsible for a violation of its international 
obligations, the scope of its obligations must first be determined. Therefore, before 
describing the other relevant provisions in the human rights treaty systems, it is important 
to address the issue that significantly limits the obligations of states in this respect: the 
limits of state’s jurisdiction.114 As a main rule, the international human rights treaties 
provide the obligation on member states to protect and ensure human rights only on their 
territory and within the sphere of their jurisdiction.115
The ECtHR, the monitoring body to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), 
has considered the issue of jurisdiction several times in its jurisprudence. In the 
Preliminary Objections phase in Loizidou v. Turkey, also considered a milestone in its 
jurisprudence, the ECtHR had to consider whether the application was admissible against 
 Outside this sphere, the state is not 
obliged by the treaty to respect or protect human rights. 
                                                 
113 Violations in the latter context include especially violations against the collective rights of indigenous 
people and the right to self-determination. See eg. Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Occupation, Inc. - How 
Settlement Businesses Contribute to Israel’s Violations of Palestinian Rights’ (HRW 2016). 
114 The question of jurisdiction, especially extra-territorial jurisdiction, is also relevant in the context of 
transnational corporations, as the impact of their actions often spreads, or is the most visible, outside the 
territory of their home country.  
115 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the European Convention on 
Human Rights, ECHR) (opened for signatures 4 November 1950, entry into force 3 September 1953) 213 
UNTS 221, art. 1; ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 2(1). For a thorough discussion of territorial jurisdiction in the 
Court’s case law, see eg. Susan Marks and Fiorentina Azizi, ‘Responsibility for Violations of Human Rights 
Obligations: International Mechanisms’, in James Crawford, Alain Pellet, Simon Olleson (eds.), The Law of 
International Responsibility (Oxford Commentaries on International Law, OUP, Oxford 2010), p. 732-735. 
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Turkey.116 The events in question had taken place in the Turkish-occupied part of northern 
Cyprus, where the applicant owned land but was prevented by the Turkish forces from 
returning there.117 The applicant claimed that Turkey had continuously breached her right 
to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the Convention and her right to 
property under article 1 of the Optional Protocol 1.118 The Turkish government claimed 
that the application was inadmissible as the events fell, instead of under its jurisdiction, 
under the jurisdiction of the regime of the self-declared “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus” (TRNC).119
Further, the ECtHR found that when a state exercised “effective control” over an area 
outside its national territory, the state would be responsible for securing the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the European Convention. The responsibility would derive from the 
effective control of the area, whether exercised directly through armed forces or through a 
subordinate local administration.
 The ECtHR noted that the concept of “jurisdiction” was not restricted 
to the national territory of the state parties, and that already in the ECtHR’s previous 
jurisprudence the responsibility of a state party might rise due to the actions of its 
authorities, even when they acted outside national boundaries.  
120 While with respect to preliminary objections the 
ECtHR only noted that it would be possible in general for Turkey to be responsible for 
violations taken place in the occupied area of northern Cyprus, in the merits phase the 
ECtHR found that due to the large number of Turkish troops placed in northern Cyprus, the 
Turkish army exercised “effective overall control” over the relevant part of the island. 
Turkey was therefore responsible for the policies and actions of the authorities of the 
“TRNC”. Individuals affected by such policies and actions thus came within the 
jurisdiction of Turkey, and Turkey was responsible for securing these individuals, 
including the applicant, their rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention.121
Since Loizidou, the ECtHR has further formulated its view on territorial jurisdiction in 
Cyprus v Turkey, Banković and others v Belgium and others and in Ilaşcu and others v 
 
                                                 
116 See eg. Marks and Azizi in Crawford et al. (eds.) 2010, supra note 115, p. 732. 
117 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections) Application no. 15318/89 (23 March 1995), paras 10-13. 
118 Ibid, para 38; see also Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits) Application no. 15318/89 (18 December 1996), para 
28. 
119 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra note 117, paras 36 and 56.  
120 Ibid, para 62. 
121 Ibid, para 56. The Court specifically noted that it was “not necessary to determine whether (---) Turkey 
actually exercises detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the ‘TRNC’”, but that the 
responsibility of Turkey for these actions arose already from its military presence, leading to “effective 
control” over the area. 
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Moldova and Russia. In Cyprus v. Turkey, the ECtHR continued to assess the jurisdictional 
issues related to the ECHR rights in the occupied area of northern Cyprus. The ECtHR 
noted that the jurisdiction of Turkey, deriving from its effective control over the area, was 
not limited to the actions of its own soldiers and officials, but extended to the actions of the 
local administration surviving due to the Turkish military support. Turkey was thus 
responsible for “securing the entire range of substantive rights set out in the Convention 
and those additional Protocols which she has ratified” within that area.122
In Banković and others, the ECtHR had to assess whether the member states of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) could be held responsible for human rights 
violations caused by the bombing of a radio and television station by NATO forces in 
Belgrade.
  
123 The ECtHR reaffirmed its position stated in Loizidou and earlier cases, noting 
that its recognition of the extra-territorial jurisdiction of a state was exceptional and limited 
to those situations when “the respondent State, through the effective control of the relevant 
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the 
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or 
some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government”, or to certain 
other instances.124 The ECtHR was not convinced that the operation in Serbia had caused 
the respondent states to have such “effective control”, and concluded that no jurisdictional 
link had been established between the victims and the respondent states.125  Thus, the 
victims had not been within the jurisdiction of the respondent states, and the states could 
not be held responsible for the violations of the victims’ rights under the ECHR.126
In Bankovic, the ECtHR also drew a distinction to its decision in Cyprus v. Turkey, where 
it had expressed concern over the creation of “a regrettable vacuum in the system of 
human-rights protection” if the ECHR was found inapplicable due to jurisdictional 
issues.
  
127
                                                 
122 Cyprus v Turkey, Application no. 25781/94 (10 May 2001), para 77. 
   The ECtHR in Bankovic noted that the ECHR “was not designed to be applied 
throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States”, but was 
intended to be a multi-lateral treaty to be applied in “essentially regional context” and “in 
123 Banković and others v Belgium and others (Admissibility Decision) Application no. 52207/09 (12 
December 2001), paras 10-11 and 28. 
124 Ibid, para 71. The other situations included for instance cases involving the activities of the state’s 
diplomatic or consular agents abroad, and activities “on board craft and vessels registered in, or flying the 
flag of” the state; ibid, para 73. 
125 Ibid, para 75. 
126 Ibid, para 82. 
127 Cyprus v. Turkey, supra note 122, para 78. 
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the legal space (espace juridique) of the Contracting States”. In the opinion of the ECtHR, 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not fall within that legal space, and its territory 
would normally not be covered by the ECHR. Therefore, “the desirability of avoiding a 
gap or vacuum of human rights” could not come into question as a basis for holding the 
respondent states responsible.128
In Ilaşcu and others v Moldova and Russia the ECtHR was to decide on the issue of 
territorial jurisdiction in the context of an arrest in the Transdniestrian region in Moldova. 
A separatist regime of the “Moldavian Republic of Transdniestria” (MRT), not recognized 
by the international community, had been established in the region in 1990, and grew into 
a secessionist movement after the declaration of independence of the Republic of 
Moldova.
  
129 The question was whether the region of Transdniestria, which according to the 
Republic of Moldova was not under its control at the time of the alleged violations, was 
within Moldova’s jurisdiction for the purposes of engaging the state’s responsibility.130 
The ECtHR was of the opinion that the Moldovan Government, which was the only 
legitimate government in Moldova under international law, did not exercise authority over 
the region under the control of the MRT.131 Despite this lack of authority, however, the 
ECtHR found that Moldova had a positive obligation to “take the diplomatic, economic, 
judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with 
international law” to secure the applicants their rights provided for in the Convention and 
noted that the issue of jurisdiction should be regarded in the light of the state’s positive 
obligations.132 As Moldova had failed to discharge its positive obligations with respect to 
the alleged violations, its responsibility for the violations could be engaged.133 With 
respect to the responsibility of Russia, the ECtHR found that the applicants came within 
the jurisdiction of Russia due to the actions taken by Russian soldiers in arresting them and 
handling them over to the MRT, and because the MRT was “under the effective authority, 
or at the very least under the decisive influence” of Russia, or that it survived “by virtue of 
the military, economic, financial and political support given to it by the Russian 
Federation.”134
                                                 
128 Bankovic, supra note 
 This support, as well as the lack of any measures taken to end the 
123, para 80.  
129 Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, Application no. 48787/99 (8 July 2004) paras 29-30 and 325. 
130 Ibid, paras 322-323. 
131 Ibid, para 330. 
132 Ibid, paras 331 and 333. 
133 Ibid, para 352. 
134 Ibid, paras 384-385 and 392. 
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applicants’ situation, led to “a continuous and uninterrupted link of responsibility” between 
Russia and the violations of the applicants’ rights.135
With respect to state authorities acting in their official capacity abroad, the ECtHR 
reaffirmed in Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain that jurisdiction for the purposes of 
the ECHR is not limited to the national territory of member states but that their 
responsibility could be invoked “because of acts of their authorities producing effects 
outside their own territory”.
 
136 However, if the authorities did not act in that capacity, as 
happened in Drozd and Janousek, the requirement of jurisdiction would not be fulfilled.137
Also the CCPR has considered the issue of extra-territorial jurisdiction. In Lopez Burgos v. 
Uruguay, the CCPR noted, in line with the attribution provisions of ARSIWA and 
similarly as in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR described above, that the term “jurisdiction” 
for the purposes of obligations under the ICCPR did not refer to the place where the 
violation took place, but to “the relationship between the individual and the State in 
relation to a violation” of the individual’s rights.
 
138 Thus, in Lopez Burgos, the mere fact 
that the violations caused by Uruguayan officials took place within the territory of 
Argentina did not mean that they were outside the jurisdiction of Uruguay. Referring to 
article 5(1) of the Covenant, the CCPR noted that “it would be unconscionable to so 
interpret the responsibility under article 2 of the Covenant as to permit a State party to 
perpetrate violations of the Covenant on the territory of another State, which violations it 
could not perpetrate on its own territory”.139 In Munaf v. Romania, the CCPR noted that a 
state could be liable for an extraterritorial violation of the ICCPR if the state was “a link in 
the causal chain that would make possible violations in another jurisdiction”, when the risk of 
an extraterritorial violation would be “a necessary and foreseeable consequence” according to 
the knowledge which the state party had at the time.140
While jurisdictional issues may limit the responsibility of a state for human rights 
violations, the state may still have an obligation to provide the victims of another state’s 
  
                                                 
135 Ibid, para 393. 
136 Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, application no. 12747/87 (26 June 1992), para 91. 
137 Ibid, para 96. 
138 Lopez Burgos v. Uruguay, communication no 52/1979 (29 July 1981) UN Doc CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, 
para 12.2. 
139 Ibid, para 12.3. Same views were reflected by the ICJ for instance in the Wall Advisory Opinion; see 
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, supra note 106, 
paras 109-111. 
140 Munaf v. Romania, communication no. 1539/2006 (21 August 2009) UN Doc CCPR/C/96/D/1539/2006, 
para 14.2. 
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violations means of redress and compensation. A provision on such an obligation is found 
for instance in the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT), article 14, according to which state parties to the 
Convention are obliged to provide in their legal systems means of redress and 
compensation for victims of torture, regardless of where or by whom the torture has 
occurred. 141
In the absence of special provisions on jurisdictional limits in human rights instruments, 
the general rules on state responsibility apply. Under these provisions, the jurisdictional 
competence of a state is primarily limited to its territory, and the jurisdiction of the state 
outside its own territory is limited by the territorial sovereignty of other states.
  
142 Thus, 
extra-territorial jurisdiction of a state for the purpose of establishing responsibility may 
come into question only when it has the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the state on 
whose territory jurisdiction is exercised, or when the state has occupied the territory in 
question.143
Recently, certain treaty monitoring bodies have expressed expanded views of state 
responsibility which would not be limited by its scope of jurisdiction. The Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which is the monitoring body for the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), has 
encouraged home states of corporations to ‘take steps’ to prevent human rights violations 
committed abroad by companies, “which have their main seat under their jurisdiction”, 
although to the extent that this does not infringe the sovereignty or diminish the obligations 
of the host state.
  
144
                                                 
141 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (UNCAT) 
(adopted 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987) 1465 UNTS 112, article 14. 
 Also the CCPR has lately encouraged Germany to provide access to 
remedies to the victims of human rights abuses committed by its corporate citizens abroad, 
and to “set out clearly the expectation that all business enterprises domiciled in its territory 
and/or its jurisdiction respect human rights standards in accordance with the Covenant 
142 Bankovic, supra note 123, para 59. 
143 Ibid, para 60.  
144 CESCR, ‘Statement of the obligations of States parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, 
social and cultural rights’ (20 May 2011) UN Doc. E/C.12/2011/1, para 5. 
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throughout their operations”.145
 
 These views will be discussed more in the next sub-
chapter which focuses more closely on the jurisprudence of the UN monitoring bodies. 
3.2.2 The United Nations Covenants 
Both major international human rights covenants adopted within the framework of the UN, 
the ICCPR and the ICESCR, impose member states positive obligations to protect the 
Convention rights. The ICCPR obliges the state party to protect individuals within its 
jurisdiction also against the human rights violations by private persons and entities.146 The 
CCPR has stated that if a state party to the ICCPR permits human rights violations by 
private parties, or fails to “take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to 
prevent, punish, investigate or redress the harm caused”, this might give rise to a human 
rights violation by the state party itself.147 States are also obliged to take measures to avoid 
the recurrence of violations and to bring to justice those responsible, and failure to do this 
might constitute a violation by the state.148
As examples of provisions that give rise to the responsibility of the state to protect against 
interference by private entities, the CCPR mentions the prohibition of torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment (art. 7), as well as the right to privacy, family, home and 
correspondence, honor and reputation (art. 17).
  
149 The text of the latter provision 
specifically mentions the right of the individual to “the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks”.150 Further, if human rights abuses take place, under article 2(3) of 
the ICCPR the state is obliged to provide effective remedies, both judicial and 
administrative, to the victims. The remedies may include, among others, ensuring that the 
violations can be effectively challenged before a court, granting appropriate compensation, 
and ensuring that similar violations do not occur again.151
                                                 
145 CCPR, ‘Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Germany’ (12 November 2012) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/DEU/CO/6, para 16. 
 
146 CCPR, ‘General Comment No. 31’, supra note 112, para 8 
147 Ibid.  
148 Ibid, paras 17 and 18. 
149 Ibid, para 8. 
150 Ibid, para 8; ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 17(2). Similar provision was already included in the text of the 
UDHR, supra note 112, article 12.  
151 F. Birindwa ci Bithashwiwa, E. Tshisekedi wa Mulumba v. Zaire, Communication Nos. 241/1987 and 
242/1987 (2 November 1989) U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/37/D/241/1987, para 14. 
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The CESCR has also addressed the issue of the state parties’ positive obligations with 
respect to activities of private parties. The CESCR has emphasized that states are primarily 
obliged to respect, to protect and to fulfill the rights provided in the ICESCR, also in the 
context of corporate activities. As regards the obligation to respect rights, states are 
required to ensure that their laws and policies concerning corporate activities are in 
conformity with the ICESCR obligations. Further, the CESCR considers states to be 
obliged to ensure that corporations demonstrate due diligence in those actions that might 
have negative impact on the ICESCR rights.152 States should also take their obligations 
into account when entering into agreements with other states, international organizations 
and other entities, such as corporations.153
According to the CESCR, the obligation to protect requires states to “effectively safeguard 
rights holders against infringements” through legislative actions and monitoring, 
investigation, and accountability procedures, as well as to ensure access to adequate 
remedies. The obligation to protect also includes the duty to provide effective remedies for 
victims of human rights abuses “through judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
appropriate means”.
 
154 As noted above, the CESCR has recognized the important role of 
the home state in preventing violations abroad, and has specifically mentioned this with 
respect to the right to water155, the right to work156, the right to social security157 and the 
right to the highest attainable standard of health.158 The described measures to be taken to 
prevent abuses abroad are described in various terms, ranging from encouraging states, 
when they can, to “take steps to influence other third parties” not to violate rights,159 to 
noting that states “should extraterritorially protect the right to social security by preventing 
their own citizens and national entities from violating this right in other countries”.160
                                                 
152 CESCR, ‘Statement of the obligations of States parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, 
social and cultural rights’, supra note 
 The 
144, para 4.  
153 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 18: The right to work’ (24 November 2005) UN Doc E/C.12/GC/18, para 
33. 
154 CESCR, ‘Statement of the obligations of States parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, 
social and cultural rights’, supra note 144, para 5; and CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 9: The domestic 
application of the Covenant’ (1 December 1998) UN Doc. E/C.12/1998/24, paras 2-3 and 9. 
155 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (20 January 2003) UN Doc E/C.12/2002/11. 
156 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 18’, supra note 153, para 35. 
157 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 19: The right to social security (art. 9)‘ (4 February 2008) UN Doc 
E/C.12/GC/19. 
158 CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)’ (11 August 2000) UN Doc E/C.12/2000/4. 
159CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 15’, supra note 155, para 33. 
160 CESCR, ‘General Comment no. 19’, supra note 157, para 54. 
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fulfillment of rights requires that states seek to co-operate with companies in order to 
realize the ICESCR rights and that corporate home states encourage these companies to 
assist host states, when necessary, in achieving the rights.161
In its General Comment number 14 on the right to highest attainable standard of health, 
provided in article 12 of the ICESCR, the CESCR addressed several issues related to the 
state’s positive obligations with respect to third parties.  The CESCR noted that while all 
members of the society have responsibilities related to the right to health, it is for the state 
to provide an environment for the fulfilment of these private party obligations.
 
162 The 
obligations of the state parties to protect article 12 rights include, inter alia, the duty to 
ensure, by legislative or other means, equal access to health care services provided by third 
parties; the duty to ensure that the privatization of health care services does not ‘constitute 
a threat’ to their availability, accessibility, acceptability or quality; the duty to control the 
marketing of medical products; the duty to ensure that all health professionals meet 
appropriate standards of education, skills and ethics; as well as the duty to ensure that third 
parties do not limit the access to health-related information or services.163 The obligation to 
fulfil the right to health includes, among others, the requirement to adopt measures against 
environmental hazards, such as pollution, and the obligation to take measures to minimize 
the risk of occupational accidents and diseases.164 The latter requires also the enforcement 
of laws and regulations and the conduct of inquiries into accidents.165 A violation of the 
state’s obligations occurs, for instance, if a state fails to regulate the actions of individuals 
or corporations so as to prevent them from infringing the right to health of others, fails to 
protect consumers or workers against practices of employers or manufacturers which are 
harmful to health, or fails to enact or enforce legislation to prevent pollution by 
industries.166
Provisions on the obligations of states to protect individuals against human rights 
violations are also incorporated in the text of several other UN human rights treaties. Thus, 
  
                                                 
161 CESCR, ‘Statement of the obligations of States parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, 
social and cultural rights’, supra note 144, para 6. 
162 Ibid, para 42.  
163 Ibid, para 35. An interesting aspect of the right to health is that the Committee has found states to be 
obliged, in order to fully comply with the requirements of article 12, to respect the enjoyment of the right to 
health and to prevent third parties from violating it in other countries as well. According to the Committee, 
states should also give this right ‘due attention’ in international agreements and in international organizations 
where they act; see para 39. 
164 Ibid, para 36. 
165 Ibid, footnote 25. 
166 Ibid, para 51. 
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according to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), the state parties commit themselves to “take all appropriate measures 
to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization or enterprise”.167 
Article 2(d) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination requires that “each State Party shall prohibit and bring to an end, by all 
appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial 
discrimination by any persons, group or organization”.168 Similar provisions are also found 
in the UNCAT,169 the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)170 and the Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.171
The CCPR and the CESCR are not the only monitoring bodies to have noted that states 
should seek to control their corporate citizens’ activities abroad.  For instance, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, when considering in 2007 the 
periodic reports submitted by Canada, expressed its concern over “adverse effects of 
economic activities connected with the exploitation of natural resources in countries 
outside Canada by transnational corporations registered in Canada on the right to land, 
health, living environment and the way of life of indigenous peoples living in these 
regions”. The Committee encouraged Canada to “take appropriate legislative or 
administrative measures to prevent acts of transnational corporations registered in Canada 
which negatively impact on the enjoyment of rights of indigenous peoples in territories 
outside Canada”, and especially, to “explore ways to hold transnational corporations 
registered in Canada accountable”.
  
172
                                                 
167 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (adopted 18 December 
1979, entry into force 3 September 1981) 1249 UNTS 13, art. 2(e). See also Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women, ‘General Recommendation No. 28 on the core obligations of States parties 
under article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (16 
December 2010) UN Doc. CEDAW/C/GC/28. 
 The Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
recommended states parties to the CRC to take into account companies’ impact on 
children’s rights both within and outside their jurisdiction, and to “consider taking 
168 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (adopted 21 December 
1965, entry into force 4 January 1969) 660 UNTS 195, art. 2(d). 
169 UNCAT, supra note 141, arts 2, 4 and 5. 
170 Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (adopted 20 November 1989, entry into force 2 September 
1990) 1577 UNTS 3, arts. 2, 3(2-3) and 4. 
171 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (adopted 13 December 2006, entry into force 3 May 
2008) 2515 UNTS 3, articles. 4-5, 15-16, and 27. 
172 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties under Art. 9 of the Convention’ (25 May 2007) UN Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18, para 17. The 
Committee on the Rights of the Child joined this concern in its concluding observations on Canada’s periodic 
report; see Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the combined third and fourth 
periodic report of Canada’ (6 December 2012) UN Doc CRC/C/CAN/CO/3-4, paras 28-29. 
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effective measures to establish and implement regulations to ensure that the business sector 
complies with international and domestic standards on corporate social responsibility”.173
The recommendations given by the treaty bodies show a tendency towards the idea that 
states may have positive obligations to control the operations of companies also when 
these operations take place outside their jurisdiction. While the general comments and 
statements of the monitoring bodies do not impose state parties any legally binding 
obligations, they are still authoritative interpretations of the rights and obligations provided 
for in the UN Covenants and give guidance over how the monitoring bodies interpret the 
state obligations for instance when considering their periodic reports. As the observations 
are public, they may also affect public policies and may be relied upon by civil society 
when calling for regulatory reforms.
 
174
 
  
3.2.3 The European Convention on Human Rights 
ECtHR has several times in its jurisprudence considered the obligations of states to protect 
the ECHR rights of individuals against abuses by private parties. These cases have 
concerned, among others, the right to life (article 2), prohibition of torture and inhuman 
and degrading treatment (article 3), right to private and family life (article 8), freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion (article 9), freedom of expression (article 10), freedom of 
assembly and association (article 11), and the right to an effective remedy (article 13).175
The case law of the ECtHR concerning the positive obligation of states to protect rights 
under article 2 against violations by private parties varies from attacks by mentally 
 
While most of these cases concern violations committed by private individuals, similar 
state obligations can arise from abuses by companies. 
                                                 
173 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under 
Article 44 of the Convention, Concluding Observations, New Zealand’ (11 April 2011) UN Doc 
CRC/C/NZL/CO/3-4, para 23. Similar recommendations were made with respect to other states as well. 
174 See eg. CESCR, ‘Rules of Procedure of the Committee: Provisional rules of procedure adopted by the 
Committee at its third session (1989)’ (1 September 1993) UN Doc. E/C.12/1990/4/Rev.1, rule no. 65, 
according to which the general comments are prepared “with a view to assisting States parties in fulfilling 
their reporting obligations”. See also rule 64 on the suggestions and recommendations on the basis of state 
parties’ reports; and Ashfaq Khalfan, ‘Accountability Mechanisms’, in Malcolm Langford, Wouter 
Vandenhole, Martin Scheinin, and Willem van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties: The 
Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law (CUP 2013), p. 394. 
175 For a thorough examination of the positive obligations of states under the European Convention, see 
Alastair Mowbray, The Development of Positive Obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2004). 
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unstable people or politically motivated fatal attacks to questions of the responsibility for 
activities by doctors in private hospitals. In Osman v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
noted that the article 2 of the ECHR not only imposed the state the obligation to refrain 
from intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also the obligation to “take appropriate 
steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction”.176 The ECtHR introduced a 
standard of responsibility, according to which the state could be considered to have 
breached its positive obligation under article 2 if it was established that “the authorities 
knew or ought to have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to 
the life of an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and 
that they failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged 
reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that risk”.177
While in Osman, the ECtHR found no breach of article 2
  
178, two years later it did find a 
breach in the case of Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, where it applied the test introduced in 
Osman.179 In Mahmut Kaya, the ECtHR found that as the authorities had “failed to take 
reasonable measures available to them to prevent a real and immediate risk to the life of 
Hasan Kaya”, the state had breached its positive obligation under article 2.180 Similarly in 
Akkoç v. Turkey, the ECtHR found a breach of the state’s positive obligation under article 
2.181 The Turkish authorities were aware that the applicant’s husband was “at particular 
risk of falling victim to an unlawful attack”, and that this risk was “real and immediate”, 
but yet they did not provide adequate protection for him.182 As the authorities had failed to 
“take reasonable measures available to them to prevent a real and immediate risk” to the 
life of the applicant’s husband, the ECtHR found a violation of article 2.183
                                                 
176 Osman v. the United Kingdom, application no. 23452/94 (28 October 1998), para 115. The case 
considered the death of the husband and father of the applicants who was killed by a former teacher of his 
son, to whom the teacher had developed an obsession. While the police had been informed of the teacher’s 
attachment, without this leading to any action by the authorities, the Court found that the applicants had 
failed to show that ‘the police knew or ought to have known that the lives of the Osman family were at real 
and immediate risk’ (para 121 of the judgment). 
  
177 Ibid. para 116. 
178 Ibid. para 122.  
179 Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, application no. 22535/93 (28 March 2000), paras 85-87 and 89-91. 
180 Ibid. para 101. 
181 Akkoç v. Turkey, application nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93 (10 October 2000). 
182 Ibid. paras 81 and 92. The applicant and her husband, who was later shot dead, had received several 
threatening phone calls and reported them to the public prosecutor, but the authorities took no action as a 
consequence. The applicant’s husband was, also due to his involvement in activities considered as unlawful 
by the authorities and in opposition with their policies, at “particular risk of falling victim to an unlawful 
attack”.  
183 Ibid. para 94. 
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In Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, which concerned the killing of the 
applicants’ son in prison by a schizophrenic man placed in the same cell, the ECtHR noted 
that persons in custody were in a vulnerable position and required protection from the 
authorities.184 The ECtHR concluded that the failure of the authorities to protect the 
applicants’ son, by placing him in the same cell with “a dangerously unstable prisoner”, 
amounted to a breach of article 2.185 In Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, while the ECtHR found 
no breach of article 2, it did note that states are under an obligation to regulate also private 
hospitals to protect the lives of patients, and to provide “an effective independent judicial 
system” to determine the cause of death of patients, as well as to make accountable those 
responsible.186 In Kalender v. Turkey, concerning a railway accident in which the 
applicants’ relatives had died, the failure of the state to implement regulations on the 
national railway company in order to protect the lives of passengers constituted a breach of 
article 2.187
With respect to the positive obligations under article 3, the ECtHR noted in A v. the United 
Kingdom, concerning the hitting of a child by his stepfather, that especially children and 
other vulnerable individuals are entitled to state protection against violations by third 
parties of their rights under article 3.
 
188 Since the law of the United Kingdom “did not 
provide adequate protection to the applicant against treatment or punishment contrary to 
Article 3”, the ECtHR found a breach of article 3.189 In Z and other v. the United Kingdom, 
the ECtHR referred to the previous judgments in A and Osman, reaffirming the obligation 
of the state to “take measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction 
are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment 
administered by private individuals”.190 The neglect and abuse of the applicants by their 
parents constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in the meaning of article 3, and as the 
authorities, aware of the circumstances, had failed to provide adequate protection for them 
against such treatment, the ECtHR found a violation of article 3.191
                                                 
184 Paul and Audrey Edwards v. the United Kingdom, application no. 46477/99 (14 June 2002) para 56. 
  
185 Ibid. paras 61 and 63-64. 
186 Calvelli and Ciglio v. Italy, application no. 32967/96 (17 January 2002) paras 49 and 57. 
187 Kalender v. Turkey, application no. 4314/02 (15 March 2010), paras 55-58. 
188 A v. the United Kingdom, application no. 25599/94 (23 September 1998), paras 7-11 and 22. 
189 Ibid. para 24. 
190 Z and others v. the United Kingdom, application no. 29392/95 (10 May 2001) para 73. 
191 Ibid. para 74. 
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With respect to the right to respect for private and family life under article 8 of the ECHR, 
the ECtHR has found states to have positive obligations to protect individuals against 
violations of their rights committed by both other individuals and private entities. In X and 
Y v. the Netherlands, concerning the sexual abuse of a mentally handicapped girl and the 
inability of her father, due to Dutch legislation, to take the case to a court on her behalf, the 
ECtHR affirmed the positive obligation on states to protect individuals against interference 
of their private lives by other individuals.192 As the Dutch law, due to regulatory gaps in 
the Criminal Code, did not provide “practical and effective protection” so as to enable the 
father to bring the case to the court when his daughter was unable to do so, the ECtHR 
found a breach of article 8.193 In Stubbings and others v. the United Kingdom the ECtHR 
affirmed its standing in X and Y that individuals are entitled to protection under the law 
against sexual abuse, but did not find a breach as the state had provided adequate 
protection in the form of criminal and civil legislation providing remedies against such 
abuse.194
The ECtHR has also considered states’ positive obligations under article 8 with respect to 
environmental harm. Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom concerned noise pollution 
caused by the Heathrow airport and the ECtHR was to determine whether the applicants 
had effective domestic remedies available to challenge the alleged interference of their 
private lives.
 
195 The ECtHR affirmed that questions of environmental pollution fell within 
the ambit of article 8.196 It further noted that regardless of whether the interference to 
individuals’ private lives was caused by public authorities or third parties, the assessment 
of the state’s obligations was based on the same test: a balance had to be struck between 
the interests of individuals and the interests of the community as a whole.197
                                                 
192 X and Y v. the Netherlands, application no. 8978/80 (26 March 1985) para 23. 
 In striking the 
balance, the ECtHR noted that the requirements of the second paragraph of article 8 “may 
be of a certain relevance” also with respect to the positive obligations of the state. Over ten 
years later the ECtHR again took into consideration the noise pollution from Heathrow in 
Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom, which considered night flights. Again, the 
193 Ibid. para 30. 
194 Stubbings and others v. the United Kingdom, application nos. 22083/93 and 22095/93 (22 October 1996) 
paras 62 and 65-67. 
195 Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom, application no. 9310/81 (21 February 1990). The Commission 
had found the application under article 8 to be inadmissible in the case, and the Court only considered article 
8 in conjunction with alleged breach under article 13; see para 29 of the judgment. 
196 Ibid. para 40. 
197 Ibid. para 41. In this case, the balance fell in favor of the community interest, and the Court found no 
breach of article 13 with respect to article 8 rights. 
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ECtHR was to decide whether a fair balance was successfully struck between competing 
interests and found that, with respect to article 8, this had been the case.198
In López Ostra v. Spain the ECtHR elaborated the connection between environmental 
pollution and right to respect for private life under article 8. The ECtHR found that severe 
environmental pollution, even if not dangerous to the health of individuals, could “affect 
individuals’ well-being and prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to 
affect their private and family life adversely”, and that the state could have a positive 
obligation to “take reasonable and appropriate measures to secure the applicant’s rights” 
under article 8.
 
199 The ECtHR concluded that as the state had failed to strike “a fair balance 
between the interest of the town’s economic well-being - that of having a waste-treatment 
plant - and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right”, a breach of article 8 had taken 
place.200
In Guerra and others v. Italy, the ECtHR considered the obligation of the state under 
article 8 to provide adequate information on the risks caused by a nearby factory, 
especially in the event of an accident.
 
201 The ECtHR referred to its judgment in López 
Ostra, affirming that the scope of article 8 extends to environmental pollution, and found 
that as the state had failed to provide the applicants “essential information that would have 
enabled them to assess the risks they and their families might run” if they continued to live 
in an area particularly at risk, the state had failed at its positive obligation under article 
8.202
The ECtHR has also found states to be obliged to actively protect freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion, freedom of expression, as well as freedom of assembly and 
association, against infringes by private parties. In Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, the 
ECtHR noted that while those who exercise their freedom to manifest their religion must 
tolerate and accept that others may oppose or deny their beliefs, “the manner in which 
religious beliefs and doctrines are opposed” by other individuals, might “engage the 
  
                                                 
198 Hatton and others v. the United Kingdom, application no. 36022/97 (8 July 2003), paras 129-130. The 
Court did find, however, a breach under article 13; see paras 141 and 142 of the judgment. 
199 López Ostra v. Spain, application no. 16798/90 (9 December 1994) para 51. The Court further noted, with 
a reference to the cases of Rees and Powell and Rayner, that the assessment, namely the striking of balance 
between different interests, would be similar whether the question was of the state’s positive obligation or of 
interference by public authorities. 
200 Ibid. para 58. 
201 Guerra and others v. Italy, application no. 14967/89 (19 February 1998) para 56; see also para 45.  
202 Ibid. para 60. 
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responsibility of the State”.203 With respect to freedom of expression, the ECtHR held in 
Özgür Gündem v. Turkey that the state had a positive obligation to protect freedom of 
expression exercised in a newspaper against attacks from private parties, and that the 
failure of the authorities to take adequate measures to protect the newspaper and its staff 
from such attacks, after being informed of them previously, led to a breach of article 10.204
In Plattform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ v. Austria, concerning freedom of peaceful assembly, 
the ECtHR noted that the participants in a demonstration must “be able to hold the 
demonstration without having to fear that they will be subjected to physical violence by 
their opponents”. The state had therefore a positive obligation to enable the exercise of the 
rights provided in article 11, by taking “reasonable and appropriate measures to enable 
lawful demonstrations to proceed peacefully”.
  
205
With respect to freedom of association related to trade unions, the ECtHR has given 
judgments as regards both the freedom to be and freedom not to be part of a union or an 
employers’ association. In Gustafsson v. Sweden, the ECtHR affirmed the positive 
obligation of a state to ensure freedom of association under article 11, which in certain 
circumstances might include the obligation to ensure the exercise of its negative 
counterpart, the right not to be part of an association.
  
206 The ECtHR however noted that 
article 11 was meant to safeguard “freedom to protect the occupational interests of trade-
union members by trade-union action” and that Sweden had a wide margin of appreciation 
in choosing appropriate measures to balance competing interests of trade union members 
and employers.207 The ECtHR found that Sweden did not have an obligation to take 
positive action to protect an employer, who had chosen not to take part in the collective 
bargaining system, against trade union action, and found no breach of article 11.208
In Wilson, National Union of Journalists and others v. the United Kingdom, the ECtHR 
considered the state’s positive obligation to protect the freedom of employees to join a 
  
                                                 
203 Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, application no. 13470/87 (20 September 1994) para 47. 
204 Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, application no. 23144/93 (16 March 2000) paras 43-44 and 46. The Court 
specifically noted that whether or not the newspaper was acting as a propaganda tool for the organization 
PKK, as the state claimed, was irrelevant when considering the state’s obligation to protect the freedom of 
expression; see para 45 of the judgment. 
205 Plattform ’Ärzte Für das Leben’ v. Austria, application no. 10126/82 (21 June 1988) paras 32-34. 
206 Gustafsson v. Sweden, application no. 15573/89 (25 April 1996) para 45. 
207 Ibid. See also para 53 of the judgment where the Court gave importance to the legitimate interests pursued 
by the trade union action. 
208 Ibid. paras 50, 54 and 55. 
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trade union.209 The ECtHR reaffirmed that the state had a positive obligation to make trade 
union action possible through means that were freely to be decided by the state, and that 
the role of the state was “to ensure that trade union members are not prevented or 
restrained from using their union to represent them in attempts to regulate their relations 
with their employers”.210 The ECtHR concluded that as the United Kingdom law had 
permitted the employers to use financial incentives to persuade the employees to surrender 
their union rights the state had failed in its positive obligation to secure the enjoyment of 
freedom of association, and found a breach of article 11.211
Finally, the ECtHR has considered the state’s positive obligations under article 13, 
providing the right to an effective remedy, in relations between private persons in Z and 
others v. the United Kingdom.  Although the ECtHR found in that case that the state had 
failed in its positive obligation to protect the applicants’ rights, the ECtHR noted that 
article 13 might not, in a case concerning the failure of authorities to protect the rights of 
individuals against violations by third parties, lead to an obligation to investigate that 
failure. An effective remedy would however be required under article 13 in such a case as 
well.
 
212
To conclude, the ECtHR has found that the state has positive obligations also in relations 
between private persons and entities under several provisions of the ECHR. A state cannot 
therefore fulfill its obligations under the ECHR by merely refraining from interfering to the 
rights and freedoms of the individuals or by protecting them against abuse committed by 
state authorities. Instead, the states need to “take reasonable and appropriate measures” to 
protect the rights of the individuals against interferences by private parties. If the state 
allows a private person or entity to interfere with the rights of individuals without taking 
adequate steps to protect them, or if the legislation of the state fails to provide adequate 
protection for an individual against abuse by others or remedies in a case of violation, the 
state violates the provisions of the ECHR. 
 
                                                 
209 Wilson, National Union of Journalists and others v. the United Kingdom, applications nos. 30668/96, 
30671/96 and 30678/96 (2 July 2002). In the case, the Court also further considered the rights related to trade 
unions and their members. It noted that collective bargaining was not indispensable for the effective 
enjoyment of the trade union freedom, and that while trade unions must be free to persuade the employers to 
listen to them, the freedom of the trade unions did not extend to posing an obligation on an employer to 
recognize them; see para 44. 
210 Ibid, paras 42 and 46. 
211 Ibid, para 48. 
212 Z and others v. the United Kingdom, supra note 190, para 109. 
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3.2.4 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
Also the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) imposes states positive 
obligations in relations between private parties.213 Article 1 states that the state parties 
“shall recognize the rights, duties and freedoms” provided in the ACHPR and “shall 
undertake to adopt legislative or other measures to give effect to them”.214 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AComHPR), the monitoring body to the 
ACHPR with a mandate to make non-binding recommendations on states,215 has 
distinguished four types of obligations under the ACHPR; the obligations to respect, to 
protect, to promote, and to fulfil the rights.216 Of these, the obligation to protect entails the 
duty of the state to protect rights holders against interferences by others, including non-
state actors, through legislation and provision of effective remedies.217
In Commission nationale des droits de l’homme et des libertés v. Chad, the AComHPR 
emphasized the positive obligations of the states and noted that “if a State neglects to 
ensure the rights in the African Charter, this can constitute a violation, even if the State or 
its agents are not the immediate cause of the violation”.
  
218
                                                 
213 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), ‘The Banjul Charter’ (adopted 28 June 1981, 
entry into force 21 October 1986) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 1520 UNTS 217. For an overview of the 
African Commission’s jurisprudence with respect to the rights provided under the African Charter, see for 
instance Olufemi Amao: ‘Civil and Political Rights in the African Charter’, and Manisuli Ssenyonjo, 
‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African Charter’, in Manisuli Ssenyonjo (ed.), The African 
Regional Human Rights System: 30 Years After the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2012). 
 The AComHPR found that as 
the state had not protected individuals against extrajudicial killings, attacks and 
assassinations during civil war, it had allowed “serious and massive violations of human 
rights” to take place. Even though there was no evidence of all these violations being 
committed by state agents, the state had “a responsibility to secure the safety and the 
liberty of its citizens” and to investigate the killings. As the state had failed to fulfill this 
214Ibid, article 1. 
215 ACHPR, supra note 213, arts. 45 (1a), 53 and 58; AComHPR, ‘Information Sheet no. 3: Communication 
procedure’, available at: 
http://www.achpr.org/files/pages/communications/procedure/achpr_communication_procedure_eng.pdf, last 
visited 7 March 2016. 
216 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) 
v. Nigeria, communication 155/96 (27 October 2001) AComHPR, Fifteenth Annual Activity Report 2001-
2002, Annex V, para 44. 
217 Ibid, para 46. The Commission has specifically stated that non-state actors include also organizations and 
corporations; see Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, communication no. 245/02  (15 May 
2006) AComHPR 21st Activity Report  May-November 2006, Annex III, para 136. 
218 Commission nationale des droits de l’homme et des libertés v. Chad, communication 74/92 (11 October 
1995) AComHPR Ninth Annual Activity Report 1995–1996, AnnexVIII, para. 20 
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duty, it was responsible for the violations of the ACHPR.219 The AComHPR repeated its 
position on state’s positive obligations in Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, 
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal 
Conference of East Africa v. Sudan, noting that the state had a responsibility to protect 
individuals within its jurisdiction, especially the vulnerable civilians in areas of strife 
during civil war.220
When discussing states’ obligations with respect to corporate action under the ACHPR, the 
case concerning oil extraction industry in Nigeria is probably the most interesting in the 
AComHPR’s jurisprudence so far. The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria concerned Nigeria’s obligation to 
protect the individuals against the pollution of their environment caused by oil extraction, 
and to provide and allow studies on the effects of the oil extraction industry, as well as its 
actions in response to protests against the pollution.
  
221 The AComHPR referred to its own 
jurisprudence, as well as to those of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the 
ECtHR, and reaffirmed its position that states are required to take measures to protect 
individuals against interferences of their rights by others.222
With respect to the right to health and to clean environment, provided under articles 16 and 
24 of the ACHPR, the AComHPR found that as a part of the positive obligations under 
these provisions, the state should monitor the social and environmental effects of major 
industrial projects, provide information to communities exposed to hazardous materials 
and activities, and to provide means for individuals to take part in development decisions 
that affect their communities.
  
223 As the state had not taken such measures to protect the 
rights of individuals, a violation of the ACHPR provisions was found.224
                                                 
219 Ibid, para 22. 
 With respect to 
220 Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, Association of 
Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v. Sudan, communications 48/90, 50/91, 52/91 and 
89/93 (15 November 1999) AComHPR Thirteenth Annual Activity Report 1999-2000, Annex V, paras 50 
and 52.  
221 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) 
v. Nigeria, supra note 216, paras 50, 55, 59, 63-64 and 67. 
222 Ibid, paras 46 and 57. 
223 Ibid, para 53. In 2012, the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) similarly held that through its omissions, Nigeria had failed to protect the rights of individuals to 
“general satisfactory environment favourable to their development”: SERAP v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) (14 December 2012) 
ECW/CCJ/JUD/18/12, para 112. 
224 Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) 
v. Nigeria, supra note 216, para 54. 
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the right to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources, the AComHPR found that as the 
Nigerian government had “facilitated the destruction of Ogoniland” by giving “the green 
light to private actors, and the oil companies in particular, to devastatingly affect the well-
being of the Ogonis”, the state had violated article 21 of the ACHPR.225 The AComHPR 
also noted that the state had an obligation to protect the individuals’ right to housing and 
right to food against interferences. 226
 
  
3.2.5 The Inter-American System 
The Inter-American system for the protection of human rights consists of several 
documents, the most important of which is the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR).227 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) are the monitoring bodies to the Inter-
American provisions.228 The Inter-American monitoring bodies have found, similar to the 
monitoring bodies of other regional treaties described above, that the ACHR imposes states 
positive obligations.229 The notion of such positive obligation, referred to by the IACtHR 
as an obligation “to ensure” the rights set forth in the ACHR, or to exercise “due 
diligence”, was introduced in Velàsquez Rodríguez v. Honduras.230 According to the 
IACtHR, the obligation implies the duty to “organize the governmental apparatus and, in 
general, all the structures through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable 
of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights”, as well as to “prevent, 
investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the Convention and, 
moreover, if possible attempt to restore the right violated and provide compensation as 
warranted for damages resulting from the violation”.231
                                                 
225 Ibid, para 58. 
 The member states to the ACHR 
are not only responsible for violations caused by the activities of state officials; also the 
226 Ibid, paras 61 and 66. 
227 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), ‘Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica’ (adopted 22 November 
1969, entry into force 18 July 1978) OAS Treaty Series no 36, 1144 UNTS 123. 
228 Charter of the Organization of American States (adopted 30 April 1948, entry into force 13 December 
1951) OAS Treaty Series nos 1-C and 61, 119 UNTS 47, art. 106. 
229 For a more elaborate examination of the Inter-American human rights system, see Raphaële Rivier, 
‘Responsibility for Violation of Human Rights Obligations: Inter-American Mechanisms’, in James 
Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility (OUP 2010), p. 
739. 
230 Velàsquez Rodríguez v.Honduras (Merits) (29 July 1988) IACtHR, Series C, No 4, paras 166-7 and 172. 
The case considered a forced disappearance allegedly committed by the Honduran police and security forces. 
231 Ibid, para 166. 
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lack of due diligence by the state could lead to responsibility, if “the violation is the result 
of a State's failure to fulfill its duty to respect and guarantee those rights”.232 The duty of 
prevention was later reaffirmed by the IACHR in Victims of the Tugboat ’13 de Marzo’ v. 
Cuba.233
 
  
3.2.6 The ILO Instruments 
The international labor standards within the framework of the ILO consist of several 
treaties and recommendations. The most important standards are freedom of association 
and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all 
forms of forced or compulsory labor; the effective abolition of child labor; and the 
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.234 Their 
fundamental importance was accepted in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work, in which the ILO member states agreed that the eight conventions 
related to these rights are binding on states on the basis of their membership in the ILO, 
regardless of whether the member has ratified them or not.235 These fundamental 
conventions include the Convention concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise,236 the Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of 
the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively,237 the Convention concerning Forced or 
Compulsory Labour,238 the Convention concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour,239 the 
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment,240
                                                 
232 Ibid, paras 172-3. 
 the Convention 
concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms 
233 Victims of the Tugboat ’13 de Marzo’ v. Cuba, case 11.436, (16 October 1996) Report no. 47/96, included 
in the Annual Report of the IACHR 1996 (14 March 1997) OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev., para 85. 
234 Some of which rights are also affirmed in international human rights treaties; see eg. ICCPR, supra note 
102, arts. 8(3) and 22; ICESCR, supra note 111, arts. 7(a) and 8. 
235 ILO (International Labour Conference), ‘ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ 
(18 June 1998, annex revised 15 June 2010), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang--en/index.htm, art. 2.  
236 Convention (no. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise (adopted 
9 July 1948, entry into force 4 July 1950) 68 UNTS 17. 
237 Convention (no. 98) concerning the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain 
Collectively (adopted 1 July 1949, entry into force 18 July 1951) 96 UNTS 257. 
238 Convention (no. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (adopted 28 June 1930, entry into force 1 
May 1932) 39 UNTS 55. 
239 Convention (no. 105) concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour (adopted 25 June 1957, entry into force 
17 January 1959) 320 UNTS 291. 
240 Convention (no. 138) concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment (adopted 26 June 1973, 
entry into force 19 June 1976) 1015 UNTS 297. 
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of Child Labour,241 the Convention concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women 
Workers for Work of Equal Value,242 and the Convention concerning Discrimination in 
Respect of Employment and Occupation.243 All 186 ILO member states have a legal 
obligation to comply with the provisions in these eight fundamental conventions.244
Several ILO Conventions impose states positive obligations to protect and to ensure 
individuals’ enjoyment of their labor rights, such as to take all necessary and appropriate 
measures to ensure that workers and employers may exercise freely the right to 
organize;
 
245 to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labor in all its forms246, to 
effectively abolish child labor and raise the minimum age for admission to employment,247 
and to create and follow a national policy to promote equality of opportunity and equal 
treatment in employment and occupation.248
The implementation of ILO instruments are supervised, firstly, through periodic reports 
submitted by states on the measures they have taken to give effect to the Conventions they 
are parties to, and on “the position of the law and practice in their country” related to 
recommendations given by the International Labour Conference.
  
249 Secondly, the workers’ 
and employers’ associations may make representations on the failure of the state “to secure 
in any respect the effective observance within its jurisdiction of any Convention to which it 
is a party”, and the representation can be published if the state fails to give a satisfactory 
statement on the matter to the Governing Body of the ILO.250 Thirdly, a member state, a 
delegate to the International Labour Conference, or the ILO Governing Body itself may 
file a complaint of the non-compliance by a state of a convention it has ratified.251
                                                 
241 Convention (no. 182) concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst 
Forms of Child Labour (adopted 17 June 1999, entry into force 19 November 2000) 2133 UNTS 161. 
 As the 
242 Convention (no. 100) concerning equal remuneration for men and women workers for work of equal value 
(adopted 29 June 1951, entry into force 23 May 1953) 165 UNTS 303. 
243 Convention (no. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (adopted 25 
June 1958, entry into force 15 June 1960) 362 UNTS 31. 
244 The list of all ILO member states is available at the ILO website, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/country.htm, last visited 1 March 2016.  
245 Convention (no. 87) concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, supra 
note 236, art. 11. 
246 Convention (no. 29) concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, supra note 238, art. 1. 
247 Convention (no. 138) concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, supra note 240, art. 1. 
248 Convention (no. 111) concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation, supra note 
243, art. 2. 
249 Constitution of the International Labour Organization (adopted 1 April 1919, entry into force 28 June 
1919 as Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles) 112 BFSP 1, art. 19(1) and (6). 
250 Ibid, arts. 24-5. 
251 Ibid, art. 26. 
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ILO Constitution specifically notes, member states can, as a final measure, refer the 
dispute subject to the complaints procedure to be decided by the ICJ.252
 
 
3.3 International Criminal Law: Direct Responsibility of Individuals and 
Condemnation of Corporate Activities 
International criminal law includes norms on the criminal liability for some of the most 
serious violations of human rights, known as genocide, war crimes and crimes against 
humanity.253 According to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the 
ICC has jurisdiction over international crimes committed by natural persons. 254 With 
respect to responsibility, this is a major difference compared to other fields of international 
law, which normally only contain norms on the obligations of states, not individuals. As 
legal persons are excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICC, under international criminal 
law the regulation of corporate activities takes place indirectly through individual 
responsibility.255
In the history of international criminal law, the war trials after World War II offer an 
example of a situation where international crimes were committed through the organization 
of companies.
 Thus, if certain corporate activities were considered as international 
crimes, the responsibility for these would fall on the individual persons, such as the 
directors of the company, not the company organization itself.  
256
                                                 
252 Ibid, arts. 29-30. 
 While in none of these trials were the tribunals able to hold the 
253 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“ICC Statute”) (adopted 17 July 1998, entry into force 
1 July 2002) 2187 UNTS 90, arts. 5-8. International crimes, as described in the Rome Statute, include 
activities which constitute violations of, among others, the right to life, the prohibition of torture or other 
cruel or inhuman treatment, prohibition of slavery, right to liberty and security, and so on. 
254 Ibid, art 25(1).  
255 The drafting history of the Rome Statute shows that other alternatives for this were also considered; see 
‘Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court’ (1998) UN 
Doc A/CONF.183/2, at p. 31, article 23(5-6) and footnote 71. The Preparatory Committee has included, in 
brackets, two further subparagraphs in the text of the article concerning individual responsibility, according 
to which the Court would have jurisdiction over legal persons as well. The Preparatory Committee notes, 
however, that “(t)here is a deep divergence of views as to the advisability of including criminal responsibility 
of legal persons in the Statute. Many delegations are strongly opposed, whereas some strongly favour its 
inclusion.” 
256 For the purposes of this thesis I will merely go through some of the most important findings by these 
tribunals. For a more thorough examination of these trials, see Anita Ramasastry, Corporate Complicity: 
From Nuremberg to Rangoon – An Examination of Forced Labor Cases and Their Impact on the Liability of 
Multinational Corporations, 20 Berkeley J. Int’l Law, 91 (2002). 
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corporations themselves responsible for the crimes, the activities of the companies were 
expressly condemned in several judgments.     
The Farben case before the United States Military Tribunal (USMT) concerned the 
criminal liability of the employees of I.G. Farben, a chemical and pharmaceutical 
manufacturing company, for plunder, slavery, and complicity in aggression and mass 
murder.257 While the company itself was not prosecuted, the role of the company in the 
commission of the crimes was emphasized in the trial, and the individuals charged were 
claimed to have committed the crimes “through the instrumentality of Farben”.258 Despite 
its lack of jurisdiction to render a verdict against a legal person, the USMT found that 
Farben had violated article 47 of the Hague Regulations on the Laws and Customs of War 
when it had acquired permanent title to property against the wishes of the property owners 
on areas occupied by German forces, resulting to a violation property rights.259 In this 
context, the USMT specifically mentioned “juristic persons” as possible violators of 
international norms.260 The USMT also found Farben to have been directly involved in war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, as it had, for example, owned and financed the 
concentration camp in Auschwitz.261
The Krupp case concerned similar crimes as Farben; the spoliation of civilian property and 
use of prisoners of war and concentration camp inmates as slave laborers in the activities 
of the Krupp firm.
 
262 Similar to Farben, the USMT held in Krupp that the company 
activities, in confiscating and permanently acquiring property from the occupied territories, 
resulted to a violation of the Hague Regulations.263 In Krupp, the USMT emphasized the 
“collective intent” of the company to engage in the criminal activities, and found that the 
company for instance had “ardent desire” to use forced labor.264
The case examples from the Nuremberg trials show that although international criminal 
law strongly focuses on the liability of the individuals behind companies, also the role of 
 
                                                 
257 The United States of America v. Krauch et al. (“The Farben case”) (October 1946-April 1949) VII-VIII 
Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals. The trial documents concerning charges 
for crimes against peace are found in volume VII of the trial documents, the documents with respect to rest of 
the charges are found in volume VIII.  
258 The Farben case, supra note 257, vol VII, p 14. 
259 The Farben case, supra note 257, vol VIII, p. 1140-41.  
260 Ibid, p. 1132-33. 
261 Ibid, p. 1183-84. 
262 The United States of America v. Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach et al., (“The Krupp case”) (October 
1946-April 1949) IX Trials of War Criminals Before Nuernberg Military Tribunals. 
263 Ibid, p. 1352-53. 
264 Ibid, p. 1372, 1412, and 1440-42. 
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the corporate entities was important in the commission of violations of international law. 
The actions of the companies were first considered to have violated international law; only 
then could the individuals behind the company be held liable.265 Since the war trials, the 
discussion of the liability of companies under international law has continued among 
scholars, and the possible criminal liability of companies has been raised especially in the 
context of conflict situations.266
 
  
3.4 Human Rights under Customary International Law  
Customary norms of international law rise from uniform and consistent state practice 
followed by the states due to a sense of legal obligation (opinio juris).267 The nature of a 
rule as part of international custom (or as a rule of “general international law”, as 
customary law is sometimes called) has several legal implications.268 Customary law 
norms bind all states, not only the ones who are parties to certain treaties, which enables 
their universal application. The customary norms of international law also limit human 
rights derogations in times of public emergency269 and they may sometimes be applied by 
an international court or a treaty body even in the absence of a similar provision in the 
treaty in question.270 While efforts have been made to define which human rights norms 
are part of international custom, the scholarly opinions on the matter differ greatly.271
                                                 
265 As for instance, in Farben, the individuals had committed the crimes through the “instrumentality” of the 
company; see Farben case, supra note 
  
257, vol VII, p 14. 
266 See for instance Christina Chiomenti, ‘Corporations and the International Criminal Court’, in Olivier de 
Schutter (ed.) Transnational corporations and human rights (Hart Publishing 2006) p. 300, where Chiomenti 
gives an example of a possible criminal liability of companies when she refers to the final report of the Panel 
of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, in which the panel had found that some companies operating in DRC had directly or 
indirectly contributed to the ongoing conflict. 
267 ICJ Statute, supra note 1, art 38(1); North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v Denmark and the 
Netherlands) [1969] ICJ Rep 3, paras 74 and 77. 
268 As for instance Clapham has pointed out; see Clapham 2006, supra note 4, p. 85-86.  
269 ICCPR, supra note 102, article 4(1): “In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation 
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to the present Covenant may take 
measures derogating from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the 
exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations 
under international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, 
language, religion or social origin” (emphasis added). 
270 ACHPR, supra note 213, art. 61. 
271 On the discussion of the inclusion of different human rights norms to the sphere of custom, see Bruno 
Simma and Philip Alston, ‘The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles’, 
12 Aust. YBIL 82 (1988-1989), at p. 84-86 and 90. 
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Some human rights norms are considered as jus cogens, peremptory norms of customary 
international law. According to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), jus 
cogens consists of norms “accepted and recognized by the international community of 
States as a whole (---) from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified 
only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character”.272 
Such norms within the sphere of human rights are, for example, the right to life and to self-
determination, and the prohibitions of torture, genocide, slavery, racial discrimination and 
crimes against humanity.273
In accordance with article 53 of the VCLT, a treaty is void if, at the time of its conclusion, 
it conflicts with a peremptory norm of general international law.
 
274 According to a norm 
codified in article 41 of ARSIWA, states are obliged to bring to an end, by lawful means, a 
serious breach of a peremptory norm of international law, and are forbidden from 
recognizing such a situation as lawful.275 Further, states are not entitled to derogate from 
peremptory norms of international law on the basis of derogation clauses in human rights 
treaties.276
Another group of customary international law provisions are norms erga omnes, which by 
definition are owed “to the international community as a whole” so that “all States can be 
held to have a legal interest in their protection”, and that “(e)ach State is entitled, as a 
member of the international community as a whole, to invoke the responsibility of another 
State for breaches of such obligations”.
 
277 Erga omnes obligations have been considered to 
derive, inter alia, “from the principles and rules concerning the basic rights of the human 
person”, and to include at least the prohibitions of genocide, slavery and racial 
discrimination, and the right to self-determination.278
                                                 
272 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) (adopted 22 May 1969, entry into force 27 January 
1980) 1155 UNTS 331, article 53. 
 Due to the collective interest aspect 
273 ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on articles 26 and 40. See also CCPR, ‘General Comment No. 29: 
States of Emergency (Article 4)’ (31 August 2001) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, para 11. 
274 VCLT, supra note 272, art. 53. 
275 As the application of this provision is limited to the serious breaches of peremptory international law, the 
threshold for finding such a situation is rather high; therefore, the provision has usually been applied in the 
context of severe violations against the right to self-determination, such as apartheid, or when a territory of 
another state has been acquired by force; see ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary on article 41, paras 6-8. 
276 Such as under article 4 of the ICCPR, supra note 102; see also CCPR, ‘General Comment no. 29’, supra 
note 273, para 11. 
277 Barcelona Traction, supra note 101, para 33; see also ARSIWA, supra note 73, commentary to article 1, 
para 4; and ibid, commentary on article 48, para 10. 
278 Barcelona Traction, supra note 101, para 34, and East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), supra note 106, para 
29. It has been suggested that human rights norms in general would fall within this category; see Crawford 
and Olleson in Evans (ed.) 2006, supra note 79, p. 474. 
50 
 
 
 
of erga omnes, if this type of international norm is breached, any state is entitled to claim 
for cessation of the wrongful act and for assurance and guarantees of non-repetition, as 
well as for reparation in the interest of the injured state or the beneficiaries of the right.279
 
 
3.5 General Principles of Law 
General principles of international law, described in article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute as 
“the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations”, are the third category of 
primary sources of international law. Usually rather vaguely formed, they are often 
considered as supplementary to treaty law and customary norms, meaning that they are 
mostly used as interpretative guidelines or as means to “fill in gaps”.280 A principle of 
international law may be formed in a treaty provision or be part of customary law, but not 
necessarily.281 The existence of a general principle is usually determined with a reference 
to municipal legal systems or to the wide acceptance of the principle among states in their 
international relations.282
While sometimes opinions have been expressed of the protection of human rights being a 
general principle of international law, such a concept has not so far been interpreted in the 
jurisprudence of any international court decision.
  
283 However, in its Reservations to the 
Genocide Convention Advisory Opinion, the ICJ found that “the principles underlying the 
[Genocide] Convention are principles which are recognized by civilized nations as binding 
on States, even without any conventional obligation”.284
                                                 
279 ARSIWA, supra note 
 Further, in Nicaragua, the ICJ 
found that the common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, concerning the rules to 
be applied in an “armed conflict not of an international character”, as well as the common 
article 1, concerning the obligation of states to “respect” and to “ensure respect” for the 
provisions of the Conventions, expressed general principles of humanitarian law, and were 
73, art. 48(2), and commentary on article 48, paras 11-12. 
280 Giorgio Gaja, ‘General Principles of Law’, in Wolfrum R (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (online edition, last updated May 2013), para 21. 
281 Ibid, para 24. 
282 Ibid, para 19. This has lead some scholars to argue that general principles are a certain type of “custom 
lite”; see ibid, para 20. 
283 South West Africa, Second Phase (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tanaka) [1966] ICJ Rep 250, p. 298. 
284 Reservations to the Convention of Genocide, (Advisory Opinion) [1951] ICJ Rep 15, p. 23, word in 
brackets added. 
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therefore applicable regardless of the treaty reservations made by the United States.285 The 
ICJ has also found the right to self-determination to be a principle of international law.286
It would thus seem that at least the most fundamental human rights norms, such as those 
prohibiting war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the right to self-
determination, can be regarded as general principles of international law. They can 
therefore provide interpretative guidelines for international courts and help fill in gaps in 
the regulatory framework.
 
287
In the context of extraterritorial state obligations, the general principle addressed by the 
ICJ in Corfu Channel must be noted. According to the ICJ, it is a general principle of 
international law that every state has the “obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to 
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States”.
 However, as several principles of humanitarian law, as well 
as the right to self-determination, are also considered to be customary norms, their status as 
general principles of international law may be of lesser effect. On the other hand, if the 
protection of human rights in general would be considered a general principle, this could 
have more influence, as it might be supportive of an idea that states were obliged to protect 
human rights on a wider scale than they do now. 
288  Brownlie has further considered 
this obligation to extend to harm caused to “persons or other legal interests” abroad. What 
is required is that the acts constituting the harm abroad take place within the territory of the 
state who is obliged to regulate its citizens.289
 
 Therefore, in the context of extraterritorial 
harms caused by a company, the principle might give rise to the obligation of the home 
state to regulate corporate activities in the event that the violating acts could, one way or 
the other, be held to have originally taken place in the territory of the home state, so that 
only the harm caused would then occur abroad. 
                                                 
285 Nicaragua, supra note 94, paras 218 and 220. 
286 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 12, para 59. 
287 The principles might even offer support for litigants seeking to argue why a legal entity should be held 
liable for violations of these rights; another issue is, whether such an argument would be considered 
influential. 
288 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, p. 22. 
289 Brownlie has also underlined the importance of the actions taking place within the home state territory, 
noting that “(i)n general a state is not under a duty to control the activities of private individuals (being its 
nationals) beyond the bounds of state territory”, including ships under its flag or controlled by the state’s 
nationals. See Ian Brownlie, System of the Law of Nations: State Responsibility (part I) (Clarendon Press 
1983) p. 165.  
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3.6 Conclusions on Regulation under International Law 
International law currently contains legally binding norms on the responsibility of states, 
and sometimes individuals, but not of companies. The responsibility of states is not very 
expansive, and the customary law norms on state responsibility are very restrictive in terms 
of holding a state liable for the acts of others. As a main rule, the state is only responsible 
for violations committed by state organs, entities exercising governmental authority on the 
basis of national legislation, or entities committing operations on the instructions of or 
under the direction and control of the state. As most activities of companies remain outside 
the sphere of these provisions, the state is usually not responsible for international law 
violations that they may commit, even if the companies were established within the state’s 
jurisdiction, or they were owned by the state.  
The international human rights law, on the other hand, has created a system, which seems 
promising at first glance. The positive obligations of states might enable efficient 
protection of human rights without any direct international liability of individuals or legal 
persons. Especially in the European human rights system the notion of positive obligations 
has a long history, and the ECtHR has given several judgments on the matter. However, 
the sphere of state jurisdiction still limits the application of positive obligations, and while 
states are required to control their authorities abroad, they are not required to regulate their 
corporate citizens acting outside their jurisdiction. Although some UN treaty bodies have 
recently expressed views and recommendations of states having obligations to protect 
individuals against the acts of their corporate citizens abroad, these comments are not 
legally binding, and do not create any new obligations to states. Therefore, the 
international human rights law currently imposes states no obligations to control their 
corporate citizens’ foreign activities.   
International criminal law, while it could in theory serve as a useful tool against managers 
of exploitative companies, is applicable only with respect to international crimes. As the 
majority of corporate-affected human rights abuses do not fall within this limited sphere of 
activities, the application of international criminal law on corporate abuses may come into 
question only very rarely. Further, while individual criminal responsibility of corporate 
heads might promote better compliance with human rights, the mere prosecution of 
individuals behind the company, in the lack of negative consequences on the company 
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itself, would not necessarily create sufficient inducement for the company to change its 
policies. 
Customary norms of international law, including jus cogens norms and obligations erga 
omnes, can be used to close certain regulatory gaps, especially those which derive from 
states not ratifying certain human rights instruments. They are not, however, able to close 
the regulatory gap resulting from the basic ideology behind human rights obligations, 
namely the profound limitations of state responsibility deriving from the limits of 
jurisdiction. The same is true with respect to most general principles of international law. 
While the general principle related to extraterritorial harm might provide a basis for the 
obligation of states to regulate their citizens’ activities from causing harmful effects 
abroad, its suitability in the context of TNCs is unclear. 
What is therefore left out of state responsibility under international law are practically all 
the activities committed by private persons or entities abroad or outside state jurisdiction. 
As a consequence, it is the burden of the host state to ensure the protection for human 
rights against violations and to provide remedies for violations that occur. If the host state 
fails, there is no one else to blame; and the chances for the victims to gain compensation, 
or even assurance of non-repetition, might be minimal.  
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4 CHALLENGES OF NATIONAL REGULATION 
As the protection of human rights heavily relies on the judicial system of the host state, it is 
relevant to examine what types of problems can be encountered within them when seeking 
to bring companies to justice for human rights violations, or when trying to ensure victims 
access to remedies. The specific problems naturally vary from one state to another, but 
especially in developing economies which host certain industries, such as extraction or 
manufacturing, with especially high risk of human rights abuses, access to justice is often 
difficult to achieve or even completely barred.  
Sometimes the legislation of the home state allows a company to be sued within its 
jurisdiction for violations committed elsewhere. The national legislation of the United 
States offers one of the rare examples of systems where national courts have, under certain 
circumstances, extraterritorial jurisdiction over legal persons for international law 
violations committed abroad.  The case law concerning the Alien Tort Claims Act 
(ATCA)290 provides an example of a system where TNCs are held responsible for human 
rights violations in the courts of their home states, but also shows what types of problems 
plaintiffs may face when relying on national legislation as a basis for extraterritorial human 
rights litigation.291 Especially the recent development in the ATCA jurisprudence in the 
US courts has substantially narrowed down avenues for foreign human rights cases, 
whereas in common law countries in general, the doctrine of forum non conveniens has 
limited the jurisdiction of national courts to hear cases related to human rights violations 
committed abroad.292
 
 Also, the separate legal personality of the parent company with 
respect to its subsidiaries creates challenges on transnational human rights litigation.  
                                                 
290 28 USC § 1350. 
291 Although there are other examples available in the US legal system on laws providing jurisdiction for 
violations of international law, such as the Torture Victims Protection Act (28 USC § 1350) and the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations Statute (18 USC § 1962).  
292 While in this sub-chapter, I will only shortly describe the legislation and case law concerning the ATCA 
in the United States as well as the jurisprudence concerning forum non conveniens in the US and in England, 
also Australia and Canada have similar legislation providing extraterritorial jurisdiction. For a discussion of 
these systems, see Sarah Joseph, Corporations and Transnational Human Rights Litigation (Hart Publishing 
2004), p. 122-127. 
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4.1 Challenges of Host State Responsibility 
The responsibility in the human rights context is often focused on the host state of the 
corporate activities. Unfortunately, the current system which relies on the host state’s 
ability to regulate legal persons within its jurisdiction faces several challenges with respect 
to corporate abuses. Firstly, the host state judicial system may be simply unable to hold a 
multinational company responsible for violations of national laws. The case may be that 
the resources to investigate abuses are inadequate, or that practical barriers, such as 
corruption or unstable national conditions, prevent cases from being effectively 
investigated or to be brought before a court. Those wishing to file a complaint may also 
lack resources to bring a case to a court. Further, if the state itself is “the prime violator of 
rights” or complicit in the company’s violations – or vice versa – it is unlikely that the 
violating state’s national judicial system would be accessible to hold the company liable.293 
In such cases, plaintiffs and victims also risk facing persecution without real chances of 
accessing justice.294
Secondly, TNCs are often able to choose where they operate and to arrange their operative 
structure quite freely, depending on the needs of the company. If national legislation 
related to the responsibilities of the TNC varies greatly from state to state, this may tempt 
the TNC to operate only within states where the regulation is not that strict. Along with the 
economic significance of TNCs for their host state, this has led to concerns regarding the 
lack of the political will of states to improve their human rights regulation in the fear of 
losing foreign investors.
  
295 In the lack of effective legal framework prohibiting human 
rights violations on the national level, there is no legal basis to bring a suit against a 
company which is merely acting in accordance with the national legislation.296
                                                 
293 See Olivier De Schutter, ‘The Accountability of Multinationals for Human Rights Violations in European 
Law’, in Philip Alston (ed), Non-State Actors and Human Rights (OUP 2005), p. 237. For an extreme 
example of such a situation, see Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) p. 336, where the US court noted that “(i)t would be rather surprising if the government of 
Sudan conducted a war of "ethnic cleansing" against plaintiffs and at the same time granted them a fair 
judicial process to remedy those injuries. In addition, it would be perverse, to say the least, to require 
plaintiffs to bring this suit in the courts of the very nation that has allegedly been conducting genocidal 
activities to try to eliminate them.” 
 Moreover, 
294 Gwynne Skinner, Robert McCorquodale, Olivier De Schutter and Andie Lambe: The Third Pillar: Access 
to Judicial Remedies for Human Rights Violations by Transnational Business (The International Corporate 
Accountability Roundtable, CORE and The European Coalition for Corporate Justice 2013) p. 33. 
295 De Schutter in Alston (ed.) 2005, supra note 293, p. 238-39. See also ICHRP 2002, supra note 18, p. 12. 
296 In such a situation, the state cannot escape its responsibility to protect human rights, as the 
characterization of an act as internationally wrongful is not affected by the fact that the act is lawful under the 
municipal law; see ARSIWA, supra note 73, article 3 and its commentary.  
56 
 
 
 
even if a national legal framework did exist, political considerations may impact the 
practical effectiveness of investigation or enforcement measures.  
Where national legislation provides a basis for liability for human rights violations, the 
separate legal personality of companies in a group often prevents holding the parent 
company liable for the acts of its subsidiary. If it is the subsidiary which operates within 
the host state and violates national laws, which is often the case with TNC related 
violations, the parent can usually not be held liable. If the subsidiary has no assets, the 
victims may have no chance of receiving any compensation for the violations.297
Finally, despite all the challenges, it must be noted that the host state judicial system is not 
always inadequate. A more positive example was the Nigerian court’s ruling in a case 
against Shell for its gas flaring activities. The court held that the domestic legislation 
permitting the gas flaring, and thus allowing the applicant’s community to be subjected to 
violations of their right to life and their dignity, was unconstitutional, and directed the 
Attorney-General and the Minister of Justice to take steps to amend the respective 
legislation.
 Further, 
the impunity of the parent company reduces the deterrent effect of the conviction of its 
subsidiary. 
298
 
  
4.2 Challenges of Transnational Litigation 
4.2.1 The Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation in the United States 
The ATCA is the most widely-used basis for international human rights cases in the US 
courts, according to which “(t)he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of 
the United States.”299
                                                 
297 ICHRP 2002, supra note 
 Its importance in providing national courts’ jurisdiction over 
extraterritorial cases filed by aliens concerning violations of “established norms of the 
18, p. 80-81. 
298 Jonah Gbemre v. Shell Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria Ltd and Others, Suit No. 
FHC/B/CS/53/05, Federal High Court, Benin Judicial Division (14 November 2005); see also Olufemi 
Amao: ‘Civil and Political Rights in the African Charter’, in Manisuli Ssenyonjo (ed.), The African Regional 
Human Rights System: 30 Years After the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2012), p. 50. 
299 28 USC § 1350. 
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international law of human rights” was discovered in the case Filártiga v. Peña Irala, 
which concerned the torturing and killing of a family member of the applicants by a 
Paraguayan police officer.300 Since Filartiga, both individuals and legal persons have been 
sued for violations of international law on the basis of ATCA. The cases on corporate 
violations under ATCA have concerned, among others, the violent suppression of protests 
against Chevron’s activities in the Niger Delta region,301 Rio Tinto’s alleged use of slave 
labor and encouragement of violence against protesters in Papua New Guinea,302 alleged 
human rights abuses related to Unocal’s pipeline project in Myanmar,303 Pfizer’s 
involuntary medical experimentation in Nigeria,304 and the business activities of several 
multinational companies in South Africa during apartheid.305
ATCA has been applied in cases where a violation of “the law of nations” or a treaty of the 
United States has taken place. The term “law of nations” has been interpreted to mean a 
norm of customary international law which is definable and obligatory.
   
306 The US courts 
have considered such norms to be, among others, the prohibitions of torture, summary 
execution, forced labor and slavery, forced relocation and racial discrimination; as well as 
the rights to associate and organize, and the rights to life, liberty and personal security, and 
to peaceful assembly and expression.307 Claims of human rights violations committed for 
instance through environmental harm have, however, been dismissed.308
                                                 
300 Dolly M. E. Filartiga and Joel Filartiga v. Americo Norberto Pena-Irala, United States Court of Appeals, 
Second Circuit (30 June 1980) 630 F.2d 876, p. 878, 880. 
  
301 Bowoto, et al., v. Chevron Corporation, et al., United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (10 
September 2010) 621 F.3d 1116. 
302 Sarei, et al., v. Rio Tinto, PLC, et al., 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated on other grounds by 133 
S. Ct. 1995 (2013). 
303 John Doe I, et al., v. UNOCAL Corp., et al., United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 395 
F.3d 932 (9 Cir. 2002). The case against Unocal later resulted in a settlement accepted by the court.  
304 Abdullahi, et al., v. Pfizer, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (30 January 2009), 562 F.3d 
163. 
305 Balintulo, et al., v. Ford Motor Co. and International Business Machines Corp., case no 14-4104, United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (27 July 2015). The original case was Khulumani v. Barclay 
National Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254 (2d Cir. 2007), but by time the claims were dismissed against all 
defendants except Ford and IBM (and finally, in 2015, against them as well). 
306 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., supra note 293, p. 306, fn 18. The requirements 
of “definable” and “obligatory” mean that the violation of the customary norm must be able to be determined, 
and that the norm is considered mandatory. While the courts have required the norm to be also “universal”, 
this has not been interpreted to require “unanimity among nations”; see Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 
707 (N.D. Cal. 1988) 709. See also Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p. 23-24. 
307 Wiwa, et al, v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, et al, United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, p. 33.  
308 Sarei, et al., v. Rio Tinto PLC, 221 F. Supp.2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 2002), 1157-58; see also Joseph 2004, 
supra note 292, p. 29. 
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Another requirement for the ATCA to be applied is that the violation must involve a state 
action. 309 This rule is derived from the reality that the majority of human rights obligations 
under customary international law are addressed on states instead of private entities.310 The 
requirement of state action can be fulfilled when the violation takes places during the 
exercise of public function; when the state is compelling the private entity; when a “nexus” 
is established between the activities of the private entity and the state; when a joint liability 
of the private actor and a state can be established through their partnership; or when a 
“proximate cause” is established, meaning that the private actor has exercised control over 
the activities of a government.311 As an example, in Sarei v. Rio Tinto, the plaintiffs 
alleged that Rio Tinto had threatened to withdraw its investment from Papua New Guinea 
if the government refused to stop local protesters and reopen its copper mine, knowing that 
such threat would likely result in the use of military force against the protesters.312 The 
court found that if such allegations could be proved, the requirement of state action on the 
basis of either joint action or proximate cause would be fulfilled.313 The state action is not 
however always required, as certain international law norms are considered to create direct 
obligations to private entities. Therefore, allegations of slave trading, genocide, and war 
crimes do not require state action for the court to have jurisdiction under ATCA; but for 
instance rape, torture, and summary execution, when not committed in pursuit of crimes 
raising individual liability, require state action.314
A complete turn in the interpretation of ATCA was introduced when the Supreme Court of 
the United States heard an ATCA case in Kiobel v. Shell, concerning Shell’s activities in 
the Niger Delta region.
  
315 The plaintiffs had claimed that Shell had recruited the Nigerian 
government to violently suppress demonstrations criticizing the environmental effects of 
Shell’s activities, and that Shell had aided and abetted the suppression by providing food, 
transportation and compensation for the governmental troops.316
                                                 
309 For other limitations on the application of ATCA, see Joseph 2004, supra note 
 The Supreme Court found 
292, at p. 40-61. 
310 Therefore, the liability of the private entity under ATCA in fact derives from its complicity with the 
violation of a state; see eg. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Kavlin, 978 F. Supp. 1078 (S.D. Fla. 1997) 1091. 
311 Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p 33-34. 
312 Sarei v Rio Tinto, supra note 308, at p. 1148.  
313 Ibid, p. 1149. 
314John Doe I, et al., v. UNOCAL Corp., et al., supra note 303, para 3; Kadic v. Karadzic and Doe, et. al., v. 
Karadzic, United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit (13 October 1995) 70 F.3d 232, 64 USLW 2231, p. 
242-44; Wiwa, et al, v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Company, et al, United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293. 
315 Kiobel, et al. v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., et al., Supreme Court of the United States (17 April 2013) 
133 S.Ct. 1659 (2013). 
316 Ibid, p. 2. 
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that the presumption against extraterritorial application of the ATCA should be affirmed, 
and as neither the text nor the historical background of the ATCA created a “clear 
indication of extraterritoriality”, ATCA should not be applied in a case where “all relevant 
conduct” had taken place outside the United States.317 The ruling significantly narrowed 
down the application of ATCA, leading to the dismissal of several cases in lower courts, 
and to a worry among human rights defenders on the closing of an avenue of litigation for 
human rights violations committed abroad.318
After Kiobel, some lower courts have allowed plaintiffs to amend their complaints in order 
to establish the link to the United States as required in the Supreme Court’s ruling, and in 
several cases the plaintiffs have managed to show such a link.
  
319 Since Kiobel, the 
application of ATCA has been interpreted to require either conduct in the US “constituting 
a tort cognizable by” the ATCA, or that the link to the US is established by “some 
combination” of three elements: the “substantial and specific domestic conduct” relevant to 
the ATCA claim; “United States citizenship or corporate status of the defendant”; and “the 
presence of important national interests”.320
                                                 
317 Ibid, p. 4, and 13-14. The Court continued: “even where the claims touch and concern the territory of the 
United States, they must do so with sufficient force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial 
application. Corporations are often present in many countries, and it would reach too far to say that mere 
corporate presence suffices. If Congress were to determine otherwise, a statute more specific than the ATS 
would be required.” (ibid, p. 14). 
 It would thus seem that while ATCA no longer 
offers as wide a basis for human rights cases as it used to, it may still provide a valuable 
source of jurisdiction in cases where the link to the US can be established. Further, the 
more limited interpretation of ATCA jurisdiction may help to better legitimize its use, 
318 See, for example, Balintulo, et al., v. Ford Motor Co. and International Business Machines Corp., supra 
note 305; Sarei, et al., v. Rio Tinto PLC, et al., supra note 302. For the reactions of the civil society, see eg. 
the statements of Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International after the Supreme Court ruling: 
HRW, ‘US: Supreme Court Limits Suits against Rights Abusers Abroad’ (29 April 2013) available at 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/04/29/us-supreme-court-limits-suits-against-rights-abusers-abroad , last 
visited 26 January 2016; Amnesty International USA, ‘Supreme Court Ruling Undermines Decades of 
Progress Toward Justice in U.S. Courts for Survivors of Human Rights Abuses Abroad’ (17 April 2013) 
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/news/press-releases/supreme-court-ruling-undermines-decades-of-
progress-toward-justice-in-us-courts-for-survivors-of-hum , visited 26 January 2016. 
319 The so-called “touch and concern” test presented in Kiobel has been fulfilled eg. in John Doe I, et al., v. 
Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., case no. 2001-1357, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia 
(6 July 2015); Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc. (Al Shimari III), 758 F.3d 516 (4th Cir. 2014); and in 
John Doe I et al v. Nestle USA, Inc., case no. 15-349, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (4 
September 2014) (the defendants’ bid in the Supreme Court to throw out the  lawsuit was rejected on 11 
January 2016). In Al Shimari III, the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia later dismissed the 
case in 2015 on the grounds of it concerning a “political question”. 
320 Doe, et al., v. Exxon Mobil Corp., et al., supra note 319, p. 16. However, the defendant’s citizenship or 
corporate status under the United States alone is not sufficient to create the link. 
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answering to the concerns of critics who saw the United States as “a civil judge of all 
violations of international law committed by private persons”.321
 
 
4.2.2 Forum Non Conveniens 
An important limitation for extra-territorial cases in common law countries is the forum 
non conveniens doctrine, which allows the dismissal of a case if an alternative and more 
convenient forum for the case is established. In the United States, forum non conveniens 
has often limited the application of ATCA already before the Kiobel case. The main rule of 
the choice of forum in the US legislation is that the plaintiff’s choice of forum will be 
respected, but the defendant may raise a claim on forum non conveniens.322 In such a case, 
the defendant must “demonstrate that an adequate alternative forum exists, and that private 
and public interests favor trial in the alternative forum”.323 In order for the forum to be 
“adequate”, the respondents must be “amenable” to a process in that forum, practically 
meaning that they consent to its jurisdiction, and “the subject matter of the lawsuit is 
cognizable” in the other forum, so that plaintiffs can obtain appropriate redress if their 
claim succeeds. The latter requires the defendants to establish that the foreign forum 
“permits litigation of the subject matter of the dispute, that it provides adequate procedural 
safeguards, and that the remedy available in the alternative forum is not so inadequate as to 
amount to no remedy at all”.324 The adequacy of the alternative forum need not mean that 
the claim would have similar chance of success as in the US, especially when the 
alternative forum is in another developed country.325 On the other hand, the reported 
corruption of the alternative forum state, or the danger that the handling of a case in 
another forum might cause the victims, have been causes not to consider a forum 
adequate.326
The “public interest” for the purposes of forum non conveniens may include policy interest 
and administrative burden as well as the interest to prevent “the flooding” of 
 
                                                 
321 Such as Tomuschat in Crawford et al (eds.) 2010, supra note 9, p. 327. 
322 Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p. 87. 
323 See eg. Sarei v. Rio Tinto (2002), supra note 308, p. 1164. On the application of forum non conveniens, 
see Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p. 87-99. 
324 Sarei v. Rio Tinto (2002), supra note 308, p. 1165. 
325 Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p. 89-90. 
326 Ibid, p. 90-91; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., supra note 293, p. 336. As Joseph 
notes, however, the courts have at times been inconsistent over what type of evidence could determine the 
courts of a certain state corrupted; ibid, p. 91-92. 
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extraterritorial cases into US courts.327 Although providing a forum for violations of 
international human rights norms has been considered as a policy interest to be given 
weight, Joseph has noted that the “public interest” has often been interpreted against the 
plaintiff.328 The private interests in turn have meant the convenience, including safety, of 
the forum for both the plaintiffs and the defendants, and the availability of witnesses and 
evidence.329
In the English courts, “the more appropriate forum” is determined by assessing whether 
another forum is more appropriate “for the interests of the parties” and for “the ends of 
justice”.
  
330 Especially the latter part of the appropriateness test has proved vital in 
extraterritorial cases, for even when the defendants have managed to show that a forum 
otherwise more appropriate would exist, the House of Lords has refused to grant a stay on 
the basis of forum non conveniens when it has found unlikely that justice would be 
achieved in the other forum.331 Such consideration has taken place for instance in Connelly 
v. RTZ, where the plaintiff was not likely to achieve legal aid in the alternative forum in 
Namibia,332 and in Lubbe v. Cape, where both the unavailability of legal aid in South 
Africa and the efficiency of handling the case as a group action were reasons to hold the 
trial in the UK.333 In Lubbe, the House of Lords also noted that in the UK jurisprudence, 
the public interests not related to the interests of parties or the achievement of justice, such 
as the overcrowding of courts, was not relevant in determining the appropriate court.334
 
  
                                                 
327 Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p. 92-94. The policy interest in the jurisprudence of the courts has meant the 
interest of the US to provide a forum for cases concerning, at the minimum, the most severe human rights 
violations. 
328 Ibid, p. 92. In the light of the Kiobel decision, where the Supreme Court noted with respect to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality that “there is no indication that the ATS was passed to make the 
United States a uniquely hospitable forum for the enforcement of international norms”, it can be presumed 
that such interpretation of ”public interest” will continue to be used; Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co, 
supra note 315, p. 12. 
329 Ibid, p. 94-95; Sarei v Rio Tinto (2002), supra note 308, p. 1164 and 1174. 
330 Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p. 115; Spliada Maritime Corp v. Cansulex Limited, House of Lords (19 
November 1986) [1987] AC 460, p. 476. 
331 Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p. 116-117. See also Schalk Willem Burger Lubbe, et al., v. Cape Plc, et al., 
House of Lords (20 July 2000) [2000] 1 W.L.R. 1545, p. 1561, where the House of Lords note that the 
requirement of “achieving justice” as spelled out in Spiliada was intended to achieve the same end as article 
6 of the ECHR, providing the right to a fair trial.  
332 Connelly v. R.T.Z. Corporation Plc., et al., House of Lords (24 July 1997), [1998] A.C. 854, p. 874. 
333 Lubbe v. Cape, supra note 331, at p. 1557-1560. 
334 Ibid, at p. 1561. 
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4.2.3 Holding the Parent Company Liable 
As in a litigation within the host state, the challenge of holding the parent company liable 
for the operations of its subsidiary causes problems also in litigations within the home 
state. There are several reasons why it would be important to hold the parent company 
liable. On the one hand, the parent may be financially better positioned than its subsidiary 
to provide remedies, and it is not as likely to “disappear” for instance due to insolvency 
issues.335 On the other hand, in extraterritorial cases, jurisdiction over foreign subsidiary’s 
or branch company’s activities abroad may be easier to establish when the parent company 
is situated within the jurisdiction of the court and when the parent can be held liable for the 
activities of its subsidiary.336
However, holding the parent company liable for the human rights abuses committed by its 
subsidiary is not simple. The separate judicial personality of a company with respect to its 
shareholders creates the so-called “corporate veil”, which protects shareholders, both 
individuals and legal persons, from liability for the activities of the company. Since the 
activities of the subsidiary are not considered as the activities of the parent company, but as 
activities of another legal person, the parent company is not liable for these activities, 
unless the “corporate veil” is lifted, meaning that the parent company and its subsidiary are 
considered the same entity for the purposes of establishing liability.
 Further, the ability to hold a parent company liable for abuses 
committed by its subsidiaries under a functioning legal system might have a deterrent 
effect and could promote the establishment of more preventive mechanisms within the 
whole group.  
337 The requirements 
for lifting the veil may differ, but quite often requires that the corporate form was abused 
in order to prevent liability of the parent.338
If the corporate veil cannot be lifted, the parent company can be held liable for its 
subsidiary’s abuses for instance if it can be established that the parent has legal obligations 
over the legality of the subsidiary’s operations and that it has breached them. Such an 
obligation would be for instance “a duty of care” over the working conditions of the 
 
                                                 
335 See eg. Joseph 2004, supra note 292, p. 129. 
336 HRC, ‘Business and human rights: further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect and 
remedy” framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’ (9 April 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/14/27, 
agenda item 3, para 107. 
337 Skinner, McCorquodale, De Schutter and Lambe 2013, supra note 294, p. 33;  
338 Ibid, p. 65. The state practice and jurisprudence of national courts was also noted by the ICJ in Barcelona 
Traction, supra note 101, para 56.  
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subsidiary’s employees. In Chandler v. Cape plc before the English courts, it was held that 
“in appropriate circumstances the law may impose on a parent company responsibility for 
the health and safety of its subsidiary's employees”.339 Another way to hold a parent liable 
for another legal person’s operations would be to successfully establish that the parent had 
“conspired” or “aided and abetted” in the abuses committed by the subsidiary.340
 
   
4.3 Conclusions on Challenges in National Regulation 
National legal systems face several challenges in seeking to hold TNCs accountable for 
their human rights violations. Within the host state of the corporate operations, the judicial 
system or the regulatory framework may be inadequate, or the enforcement of the 
legislation is affected by political interests and corruption. Victims of human rights 
violations may risk persecution in seeking to bring a case to the court, or they may have 
inadequate resources to raise claims. The separate legal personality of the parent company 
from its subsidiary leads to the impunity of the parent and may frustrate access to any 
compensation.  
While some states do have national legislation providing their national courts with 
jurisdiction over transnational entities for violations of international law, extraterritorial 
litigations within these systems are affected by the forum non conveniens doctrine, the 
limitations on the application of legislation with respect to different types of violations of 
human rights, and the legal challenges caused by complex corporate structures. Other 
challenges include short statutes of limitation and the unavailability of evidence and the 
high costs of litigation in transnational cases.341
                                                 
339 Chandler v. Cape plc, Court of Appeal (25 April 2012) [2012] 1 W.L.R. 3111, p. 3131. Although in this 
case, both the parent and the subsidiary were based in the UK; see ibid, p. 3114. The “duty of care” approach 
has been considered to be favorable for human rights claims, as it gives an incentive on the parent to exercise 
due diligence over the activities of its subsidiary, and on the other hand replaces the burden of plaintiffs to 
show reasons why the “corporate veil” should be lifted; see Skinner et al 2013, supra note 
 All these difficulties substantially limit the 
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction and further bar the victims’ access to justice. 
337, p. 67. 
340 These and other means to hold the parent company liable are presented in a 2014 report by Amnesty 
International; Amnesty International, 2014, supra note 13, p. 118-122. 
341 Skinner, McCorquodale, De Schutter and Lambe 2013, supra note 294, p. 11-18. See also HRC, ‘Report 
of the Special Representative 2011’, supra note 43, Annex ‘Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, principle 26, p. 23. 
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It must also be noted that the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction is still very rare, and 
so the greatest challenge on the home state level is caused by the lack of legislation 
providing national courts with jurisdiction in extraterritorial human rights cases.342 The 
lack of legislative basis in the majority of states for transnational litigation could also lead 
to “the prisoner’s dilemma” also in the home states, so that the fear of corporate citizens 
moving abroad would bar initiatives to hold them responsible for abuses committed 
abroad.343 On the other hand, the concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction has been criticized 
as compromising the principle of sovereign immunity of states and artificially expanding 
the jurisdiction of the state organs over the territory of other states.344
 
  
 
  
                                                 
342 Further, the status of plaintiffs differs from state to state, which might cause additional obstacles for 
instance with respect to evidence in transnational cases. Joseph has indeed noted that the “plaintiff-friendly 
nature” of the US justice system has had significant impact in the success of the ATCA cases; see Joseph 
2004, supra note 292, p. 16-17. 
343 Olivier De Schutter, in Alston (ed) 2005, supra note 293, p. 228-229.   
344 See eg. Tomuschat in Crawford, Pellet, and Olleson (eds.) 2010, supra note 9, p. 327, and Clapham 2006, 
supra note 4, p. 253. 
65 
 
 
 
5 CONSEQUENCES OF LOOPHOLES AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK  
In this final chapter, I will contemplate the consequences of regulatory loopholes on the 
protection of human rights, and what is needed to close them. I will start with the question 
of how the current regulation of transnational corporate activities relates to the states’ 
positive obligations under international human rights treaties. While the regulatory gaps 
both on national and international level may have negative impact on human rights in 
several ways, I argue that some of the most profound problems are caused with respect to 
the right to effective remedy and access to justice. By examining these issues, I seek to 
show that the current approach to corporate responsibility and the static understanding of 
international law have lead us to a situation where human rights are not effectively 
secured. 
I will then turn to discuss the prospects of an international legal framework that would 
address the current problems. I will seek to argue that the answer is the creation of a 
binding international legal framework that would address corporations as actual 
international duty-bearers. Finally, I will take a look at the most recent work taken within 
the UN and the EU to face the challenges caused by corporate activities on human rights.  
 
5.1 Consequences of Regulatory Gaps on Human Rights Protection from the 
Viewpoint of the Right to Remedy 
The right to an effective remedy is provided in several major human rights documents, 
including the UDHR, the ICCPR, the regional human rights treaties, and several thematic 
treaties within the UN.345 Further, the right to effective remedy has been considered to be a 
customary rule of international law,346
                                                 
345 See UDHR, supra note 
 and it reflects the general principle of international 
112, art. 8, ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 2(3); International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra note 168, art. 6; CESCR, ‘General Comment No. 3: 
The nature of States parties’ obligations (art. 2, para. 1, of the Covenant)’ (1 January 1991) UN Doc 
E/1991/23; ACHR, supra note 227, art. 25; ECtHR, supra note 115, art. 13; ACHPR, supra note 213, arts. 
1(1), 7, and 21.  
346 See eg. findings in this respect of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in Prosecutor v. André 
Rwamakuba (Decision on Appropriate Remedy), case no. ICTR-98-44C-T, (31 January 2007), para 40. 
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law according to which “any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make 
reparation”.347
The duty of states to provide effective remedies is a part of their positive obligations under 
human rights treaties and includes both the duty to provide access to justice and the duty to 
take adequate measures to prevent or to redress violations.
  
348 Victims of human rights 
violations should have their rights determined by a competent authority, whether judicial, 
administrative, legislative or other, provided by the legal system of the state, and the 
remedies granted should be enforced.349 Remedies must be effective, meaning that the 
remedial body must be independent from the authorities responsible for the violation and 
able to afford redress, that the rights can be invoked in the body, and that the procedure is 
fair and factually effective.350 The needs of especially vulnerable people, such as children, 
should be taken into account when providing access to remedies.351 If a violation is found, 
the state is required to provide reparation for the victims of human rights violations, which 
can take place through multiple means, such as compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, 
measures of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition.352 States are also required to 
bring to justice those responsible for violations and to ensure that ongoing violations are 
ceased.353
The type of remedy to be provided depends on the violation in question. While under 
several human rights systems, states have the freedom to choose whether to provide 
judicial or other remedies, judicial remedies are necessary for instance when the right in 
  
                                                 
347 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland)(Merits) [1928] PCIJ Rep Series A No 17, 
p 29. 
348 Dinah Shelton, ‘Human Rights, Remedies’, in Wolfrum R (ed), Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public 
International Law (online edition, last updated July 2006). The positive duties of states in general are 
discussed in chapter 3.2, above. See also CCPR, ‘General Comment no 31’, supra note 112, para 8, HRC, 
‘Report of the Special Representative 2011’, supra note 43, Annex ‘Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework’, Principle 25. 
349 ICCPR, supra note 102, art. 2(3). See also UNGA Res 60/147 ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines on the 
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and 
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law’ (21 March 2006) UN Doc A/RES/60/147, art. 11.  
350 Shelton 2006, supra note 348, para 3. See also consideration of the effectiveness of remedies by the 
ECtHR in Čonka v. Belgium, application no. 51564/99 (5 May 2002) para 75. 
351 CCPR, ‘General Comment no 31’, supra note 112, para 15. 
352 Ibid, para 16. According to the CCPR, measures of satisfaction can include for instance “public apologies, 
public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and practices, as well as 
bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations”. At times, specific reparations are required, 
such as in article 14(1) of the UNCAT, requiring states to provide compensation and rehabilitation for 
victims of violations of the UNCAT rights; UNCAT, supra note 141, art. 14(1).  
353 CCPR, ‘General Comment no 31’, supra note 112, paras 15 and 18. 
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question “cannot be made fully effective without some role for the judiciary”.354 Monetary 
compensation is not necessarily adequate remedy, especially when the violation is a result 
of a systematic problem or when restitution is possible.355 Other remedies may include, for 
instance, public investigation of violations, changing the offending regulation, and 
ensuring non-repetition.356
In the context of human rights violations committed by TNCs, the victim’s right to remedy 
is often factually blocked due to the loopholes discussed in the previous chapters. The first 
problem in this respect often appears in the host state of the corporate activities, where the 
violations physically take place. As noted above, especially in developing states the 
judicial and administrative systems often do not provide adequate remedies, for instance 
due to their lack of power, or because of the pressure from governmental authorities or 
even the corporation itself. In such a situation, when the victim’s access to remedy is 
factually barred, it is clear that the host state has failed to fulfill its positive obligations 
under international law.  
  
The next problem arises when one seeks to find access remedies elsewhere. The systems of 
the company’s home state are hardly ever useful due to the jurisdictional limitations of 
human rights obligations. With the exception of the prosecution of individuals for certain 
international crimes, states usually do not have jurisdiction or an obligation to bring to 
justice those liable for violations of human rights outside their own jurisdiction.357 
Therefore, the home state of the company is usually not obliged to provide access to 
remedy for the victims of human rights violations taken place outside its jurisdiction.358
                                                 
354 CESCR, ‘General comment No. 9’, supra note 
 
Further, even if the home state did provide access to remedy, the complex corporate 
154, para 9; see also ECtHR, Čonka v. Belgium, supra note 
350, para 75. On the other hand, for instance the American regional system seems to require judicial 
remedies; see American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 227, art. 25. 
355 For instance, in Papamichalopoulos v. Greece (Article 50), the ECtHR noted that the Convention poses a 
duty on states to do more than a mere monetary compensation, in that case “to put an end to the breach and 
make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to restore as far as possible the situation existing 
before the breach”; see Papamichalopoulos v. Greece (Article 50), application no. 14556/89 (31 October 
1995) para 34. See also Shelton 2006, supra note 348, para 9. 
356 Shelton 2006, supra note 348, paras 5 and 9. 
357 The principles of universality and complementarity under international law are expressed in the preamble 
of the Rome Statute of the ICC, in which the adhering states affirm that “the most serious crimes of concern 
to the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must 
be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation”, and agree 
that “it is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international 
crimes”; see ICC Statute, supra note 253, preamble paras 4 and 6. 
358 An exception to this is the requirement that states provide access to redress and compensation for victims 
of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; see UNCAT, supra note 141, article 14. 
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structure and the norms related to attribution of responsibility among members of the 
corporate group may still frustrate the application of such legislation, not to mention the 
practical challenges of transnational claims.359 The final route for the victim is offered by 
human rights instruments on international or regional level. The problem here is that, as the 
human rights treaties are addressed on states only, even if a treaty body made a 
recommendation or a judgment on the failure of the host state to fulfill its positive 
obligations, it would not be able to find corporations legally liable for the violations. This, 
in turn, leads to the practical impunity of the actual perpetrator.360
This is certainly not a desirable situation. The right to remedy lies in the core of human 
rights protection, and as the Committee on the Rights of the Child has noted, “(f)or rights 
to have meaning, effective remedies must be available to redress violations”.
 
361
These barriers to remedy have not been left unnoticed in the discussion on TNCs and 
human rights. In 1997, a Special Rapporteur of the United Nations Commission on Human 
Rights expressed his concern of the inadequacy of remedies with respect to violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights by TNCs, and suggested that states and the 
international community should cooperate in order to address these challenges.
 Yet, 
despite the indisputable importance of this right, the current legal system inevitably leads 
to a very unequal access to remedy, depending on where the violations take place. 
362 
Moreover, one of the three “pillars” which the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights are laid upon is the access to remedy.363
                                                 
359 See chapter 
 When drafting the principles, 
Special Representative Ruggie noted that “(r)eality falls far short of constituting a 
comprehensive and inclusive system of remedy for victims of corporate-related human 
rights abuse” and that, despite some progress in the field, both state-based and company-
4.2, above. See also HRC, ‘Business and human rights: further steps toward the 
operationalization of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework, Report of the Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises’, supra note 336, paras 104-13. 
360 Which impunity, as noted by the HRC in the context of international crimes, “encourages such violations 
and is a fundamental obstacle to the observance and full implementation without discrimination of any kind 
of human rights and international humanitarian law”; see UN Commission on Human Rights, Res 2005/81, 
‘Impunity’ (21 April 2005) UN Doc E/CN.4/RES/2005/81, preamble, para 5.  
361 Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No. 5: General measures of implementation of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, para. 6)’ (27 November 2003) UN Doc 
CRC/GC/2003/5, para 24. 
362 UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, ‘The Realization of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Final report on the question of the impunity of perpetrators of human 
rights violations (economic, social and cultural rights)’ (27 June 1997) UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/8, paras 
131 and 142(b). 
363 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 46, principles 25-31. 
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based remedial mechanisms were underdeveloped.364 The commentary to Principle 26, 
concerning obligation of states to ensure effective access to judicial remedies, notes that 
“(e)ffective judicial mechanisms are at the core of ensuring access to remedy”, and 
recommends that “(s)tates should ensure that they do not erect barriers to prevent 
legitimate cases from being brought before the courts”. In this respect, the commentary 
mentions both legal barriers, such as lack of home state jurisdiction and corporate 
structure, and practical barriers, such as high costs of litigation and lack of resources to 
investigate violations.365 The Special Representative stated that gaps in the access to 
administrative remedies should be filled, and that effective non-state based remedy 
mechanisms should be further developed.366 The CESCR has also noted, in its 2011 
Statement on the obligations of States Parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, 
social and cultural rights, that “(i)t is of utmost importance that States Parties ensure access 
to effective remedies to victims of corporate abuses of economic, social and cultural rights, 
through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate means”.367 Also the CCPR 
has recommended a state to provide remedies to victims of the human rights violations 
committed by its corporate citizens abroad.368
In 2011, a group of international law experts adopted the Maastricht Principles on 
Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.
 
369 The principles were based on the acknowledgement of challenges inflicted on 
the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights by globalization and the influence of 
states and other global actors, as well as on the commitment of states to realize these 
rights.370
                                                 
364 HRC, ‘Business and human rights: further steps toward the operationalization of the “protect, respect and 
remedy” framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human 
rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’, supra note 
 The principles presented an expanded notion of states’ human rights obligations, 
336, para 117. 
365 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 46, commentary on principle 26.  
366 Ibid, commentary on principles 27-31. 
367 CESCR, ‘Statement on the obligations of States Parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, 
social and cultural rights’, supra note 144, para 5. 
368 CCPR, ‘Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Germany, adopted by the Committee at 
its 106th session (15 October - 2 November 2012)’ supra note 145, para 16. 
369 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (adopted 28 September 2011, final version 29 February 2012), available at 
http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/web/Institutes/MaastrichtCentreForHumanRights/MaastrichtETOPrincip
les.htm, last visited 26 February 2016. The signatories to the principles consisted of individuals from 
academic world, national human rights institutions and civil society, including several former and current UN 
Special Representatives, Special Rapporteurs and Committee members; see ibid, annex ‘Signatories to the 
Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights’. 
370 Ibid, preamble paras 1-2, 4, 6. 
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according to which a state should respect, protect and fulfill human rights not only in 
situations when it exercises authority or effective control, but also when the state’s acts or 
omissions “bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights”, either within or outside the state’s territory, or when the state “is in a 
position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize economic, social and 
cultural rights extraterritorially”.371
The principles suggest that states have an extraterritorial obligation to protect human 
rights, meaning that they should take necessary measures “to ensure that non-State actors 
which they are in a position to regulate”, including transnational companies, “do not 
nullify or impair the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights”.
  
372 According to 
the principles, the state is “in a position to regulate” the non-state actors when the harm or 
its threat occurs in its territory; when the non-state actor has the nationality of the state; 
when the company or its parent or controlling company has its center of activity, is 
registered or domiciled or has its main place of business or substantial business activities in 
the state; where there is another “reasonable link” between the state and the conduct to be 
regulated; or when the conduct constitutes a violation of a peremptory norm of 
international law or an international crime, in which case the state should exercise 
universal jurisdiction.373
When a state is in a position to influence a conduct, even when it is not in a position to 
regulate it, the state should use that influence to protect the economic, social and cultural 
rights.
  
374 States should cooperate to ensure that non-state actors do not impair the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights, and to that end take measures to prevent 
abuses, to hold perpetrators to account and to ensure effective remedies for victims of 
abuse.375 With respect to remedies, the principles note that when the conduct causing 
harmful effects takes place in a different state than where the actual harm through a 
violation of rights occurred, “any State concerned must provide remedies to the victim”, 
and that the states concerned should cooperate to ensure remedies.376
                                                 
371 Ibid, principle 9. 
  
372 Ibid, principle 24. 
373 Ibid, principle 25. 
374 Ibid, principle 26. 
375 Ibid, principle 27. 
376 Ibid, principle 37 
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Although the Maastricht principles were aimed to “clarify the content of extraterritorial 
State obligations to realize economic, social and cultural rights”, and they were in many 
respects in line with the views of the CESCR, they do not yet reflect the mainstream views 
of international law.377
Also the civil society has taken part in the discussion on remedies and regulatory gaps. In 
2013, a report on remedies and barriers in their effective application, compiled by several 
distinguished scholars in the field, was published in concert by the International Corporate 
Accountability Roundtable (ICAR), a network of civil society and legal experts called 
CORE, and the European Coalition for Corporate Justice (ECCJ).
 They do, however, provide views of highly respected international 
legal experts on how states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations should be applied in 
order to ensure the enjoyment of these rights, and may thus prove to be useful in the search 
for answers to the current dilemma of transnational corporate operations and their impact 
on human rights.  
378 The report reflected 
the views expressed in the Maastricht principles, and suggested that the state obligation to 
protect individuals against human rights violations and to provide remedies would apply 
extraterritorially, and that the home state and the host state should therefore cooperate to 
ensure that these positive obligations were fulfilled also in the context of transnational 
corporate activities.379
In a report published in 2014, Amnesty International expressed similar concerns as those 
raised in the 2013 report by ICAR, CORE and ECCJ, and noted that the obstacles faced by 
human rights victims are at times “so significant as to undermine the human right to 
effective remedy”.
  
380 It was recommended in the report that when the perpetrator of a 
human rights violation abroad is a company, the state where the company is headquartered 
should offer the victims access to remedy within its jurisdiction, even when the state was 
not in a position to prevent the abuse.381
                                                 
377 Ibid, preamble para 8; for the CESCR’s views on states’ extraterritorial obligations, see chapter 
 Especially the report highlighted the difficulty 
brought about by the separate legal personality of companies in a group, making it difficult 
to hold the parent company liable for the abuses committed by its subsidiary, and noted 
that the enjoyment of the right to effective remedy required that the parent company was 
3.2.2, 
above. 
378 Skinner, McCorquodale, De Schutter and Lambe 2013, supra note 294. 
379 Ibid, p. 25-26. 
380 ‘Amnesty International, 2014, supra note 13, p. 113 and 140. 
381 Ibid, p. 140. 
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involved in the remedial process.382 It was suggested that as part of their positive human 
rights obligations, states had the duty to carry out a legal reform to eliminate the barriers to 
remedies. The legal reform would include more extensive liability of parent companies, 
including duty of care in their global operations and presumption of responsibility under 
certain circumstances; elimination of forum non conveniens in human rights cases; and 
enhanced international cooperation between home and host states.383
Overall, the consequences of the current legal loopholes on the right to effective remedy 
are indisputably severe, and are not likely to disappear without positive actions by states 
and substantive legal reform both on the national and international sphere. In order to face 
the problems caused by extraterritoriality on the enjoyment of the right to remedy, as well 
as other human rights, old views of the responsibilities of states and companies must be 
challenged and new approaches sought.  
   
 
5.2 Prospects of International Legal Framework 
In the light of the consequences of regulatory gaps discussed above, it would seem that 
these loopholes should be closed. There are several different ways to address the issue, 
such as by further developing the current voluntary initiatives, by enhancing judicial 
systems within the host states, by enforcing regulatory reforms within home states through 
national measures, by cooperation on the international level, or by developing international 
legal framework.  
In my opinion, a regulatory reform on the international level would be the best and the 
only genuinely effective way to close the gaps in the current regulation. In practice, the 
reform would most likely mean the adoption of a new human rights treaty, in which the 
adhering states would acknowledge the direct responsibility of TNCs – and possibly some 
other non-state actors – for human rights violations under international law, along with the 
responsibility of the home states to regulate their corporate citizens and to protect 
individuals from abuses also outside their jurisdiction, as well as the remaining duty of the 
host state to provide protection. A new treaty would thus provide a reference point for 
                                                 
382 Ibid, p. 141-142. 
383 Ibid, p. 142-154. 
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national regulatory systems to develop. The UN Guiding Principles might prove to be 
helpful in the drafting process of a new treaty, and provide the basis on which new 
regulation could be formed.  
There are several reasons why an international legal framework would be important in 
regulating corporate human rights impact. Firstly, as noted in connection with the critique 
expressed against voluntary initiatives, in order for rules to be followed, they need to be 
mandatory, not voluntary.384 Secondly, the need for an international framework derives 
from the very nature of the issue to be regulated. The majority of the operations of 
transnational corporations are, by definition, transnational; and thus they should be 
regulated by international, not only by national means. Protection of human rights against 
transnational abuses should be seen similar to the protection of environment from 
transnational harms, combating bribery and corruption, or suppressing terrorism, over 
which issues states have drafted treaties on international cooperation.385 Such as in these 
issues, the effective protection of human rights from the abuses of TNCs requires 
international cooperation between home and host states, along with the establishment of an 
international benchmark on the basis of which national regulation can be developed. Due 
to the mobility of several TNC operations, individual states may have limited ability to 
regulate TNCs by separate actions, and they may face “prisoner’s dilemma”, in which fears 
of TNCs moving abroad may frustrate all efforts of normative reforms on the national 
level.386
                                                 
384 See chapter 2.2.2, above. A call for the establishment of binding duties on companies was also expressed 
by Puvan J. Selvanathan, a member of the UN Working Group of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Businesses, as he resigned, in his open letter to the President of the Human Rights 
Council. Referring to his work experience in several companies, he noted: “I have come to understand that 
businesses are machines designed to do only certain things and will always strive to do them as efficiently 
and cost-effectively as possible. The loudest calls within a company for higher goals are distant echoes if 
even a whisper for profit exists.(---) if states wish for businesses to respect human rights then what that 
constitutes must be made mandatory. Otherwise it is just voluntary”. Open letter from the member of the 
Working Group of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Businesses, Puvan J 
Selvanathan, to the President of the Human Rights Council, Joachim Rücker (15 December 2015). 
 With international cooperation, organized through a multilateral treaty, the ability 
of TNCs to escape liability by moving abroad could be reduced, and both home and host 
states might have more interest to regulate corporate activities when they knew that others 
385 For instance, in his 2010 report, the Special Representative Ruggie referred to the transnational 
cooperation in these areas; see HRC, ‘Business and human rights: further steps toward the operationalization 
of the “protect, respect and remedy” framework, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises’, supra 
note 336, para 46. See also International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism 
(adopted 9 December 1999, entry into force 10 April 2002) 2178 UNTS 197; and UN Convention Against 
Corruption (adopted 31 October 2003, entry into force 14 December 2005) 2349 UNTS 41. 
386 De Schutter in Alston (ed) 2005, supra note 293, p. 229 and 238-39. 
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were doing the same. Also, mutual agreement on the establishment of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction for national courts might reduce the critique expressed against the legitimacy 
of such legislation.387
A common legal framework would also benefit the plaintiffs in human rights cases. The 
enjoyment of the right to remedy by the victims of TNCs’ abuses would no longer depend 
entirely on where the violations have taken place, or whether a jurisdictional link to a state 
with supportive legislation could be established. This could also reduce the risk of sudden 
changes in the jurisprudence of national courts, such as that witnessed in the US courts in 
Kiobel.
 
388
An international framework would be beneficial for companies as well, since a common 
international benchmark would reduce the uncertainty of what is required of them. Further, 
such as legally binding regulation, international legal duties would diminish the ability of 
“free-riders” to take advantage of regulatory gaps to the disadvantage of the “morally” 
operating companies.
  
389
On the other hand, plausible concerns can be raised over such a treaty. Firstly, as the treaty 
would most likely be a result of compromise between different state interests – as the 
majority of the most widely ratified treaties are – there is a risk that the provisions would 
not be as ambitious as one might hope, or even that the treaty would remain as yet another 
declaratory instrument. Also, with the rights and duties set down in legally binding norms, 
there is a risk that loopholes would still remain, making it easy for companies to escape all 
liability. Not only would companies then plan their taxes, they would also plan their 
transnational operations to ensure that no human rights responsibility could be attributed to 
them.  
 
There is, however, a strong moral argument in favor of an international legal framework to 
hold companies directly responsible for their human rights abuses. The international 
framework would underline the gravity of corporate human rights abuses and constitute 
                                                 
387 See chapter 4.3, note 344, above. 
388 See chapter 4.2, above. 
389 See chapter 2.2.2, at p. 14, above. See also ICHRP 2002, supra note 18, p. 18-19, noting that for instance 
the US companies, faced with the restrictive norms of US legislation on the prohibition of corruption, 
supported the drafting of an international anti-corruption treaty, in order to ensure that same rules would 
apply to all companies. Similarly, the ILO labor standards are claimed to have originally been created to 
prevent the competitive disadvantage of those states with legislation protecting workers’ rights; see Patrick 
Macklem: ‘The Right to Bargain Collectively in International Law: Workers’ Right, Human Right, 
International Right?’, in Philip Alston (ed.), Labour Rights as Human Rights (OUP 2005), p. 64. 
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universal condemnation of them, similar to the current human rights norms, or the norms 
concerning international crimes. Further, legal framework providing international 
responsibility would also be in line with the general principle of international law, 
according to which the breach of an obligation is followed by an obligation to provide 
reparation for the harm caused.390
 
 Direct liability would illustrate that regardless of the 
identity of the wrongdoer, violations of international law are always followed by 
international responsibility. 
5.3 Recent Developments within International Organizations 
Corporate responsibility is a constantly developing field and work on the issue currently 
takes place in several instances. Possibly the most ambitious initiatives have recently been 
taken within the UN. In 2014, the HRC adopted Resolution 26/9 by which it established an 
open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises with respect to human rights, with a mandate to “elaborate an 
international legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises”.391 This was a 
significant step forward in the regulation of corporate responsibility, and the first initiative 
to draft a binding treaty after the adoption of the 2003 UN Draft Norms.392 So far, the 
working group has gathered once, in July 2015, which session was “dedicated to 
conducting constructive deliberations on the content, scope, nature and form of the future 
international instrument”.393
                                                 
390 Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Germany v Poland), supra note 
 The draft report of the first session shows that several 
delegations expressed their concern that the UN Guiding Principles “do not get to the core 
of the discussion of maximum protection of human rights and access to remedies”, but that 
additional international standard was required in order to “strengthen national capabilities 
347, p. 29. 
391 HRC Res 26/9, ‘Elaboration of an international legally binding instrument on transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises with respect to human rights’ (14 July 2014) UN Doc A/HRC/RES/26/9, para 
1.  
392 See chapter 2.2.1, above. 
393 Which program is in accordance with the HRC Resolution 26/9, supra note 391, para 2; see also ‘Draft 
report of the Open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises with respect to human rights on its 1st session’ (10 July 2015), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session1/Pages/Draftreport.aspx, last visited 28 
February 2016. 
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to ensure human rights protection in the domestic sphere”.394 Whether the working group 
will succeed in drafting an effective international legal framework for business and human 
rights remains to be seen; in any event, it will most likely take several years before a draft 
treaty can be presented.395
Within the EU, the directive 2014/95/EU on disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups was adopted in 2014.
 
396 The 
directive requires “public-interest entities” with over 500 employees in average during the 
financial year to include in the management report a non-financial statement which is to 
include information related to environmental, social and employee issues, respect for 
human rights, anti-corruption, and bribery. The information to be presented includes 
description of the company’s policies related to the relevant issues, including their due 
diligence processes, the outcome of the policies, as well as information on the risks and 
how those risks are managed.397 The same requirements apply to company groups which 
exceed the threshold of the reporting obligation, in which case the parent company will 
submit the non-financial information concerning the entire group.398 The reporting can be 
based on national, union-based or international frameworks, such as the Global Compact, 
the UN Guiding Principles, or the OECD Guidelines, but it is not necessary.399 EU 
member states are to enforce legislation and other provisions implementing the directive by 
6 December 2016, and to ensure that the national provisions will apply for the financial 
year starting 1 January 2017 or during the calendar year 2017.400 The member states are 
encouraged to provide effective means to ensure that the reporting duties are followed by 
companies.401
                                                 
394 Ibid, para 20. 
 Another current matter within the EU is the European Commission’s 
proposal for regulation on the supply chain due diligence and reporting duties of 
395 The second session was recommended to be held in 2016; see ibid, para 90. 
396 Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 amending 
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity information by certain large 
undertakings and groups [2014] OJL 330/1. 
397 Ibid, art. 19a(1). If the company has no policies in all the relevant fields under the directive, the reason for 
this must be presented in the non-financial statement; see ibid.  
398 Ibid, art. 29a(1). 
399 Ibid, art. 29a(1), and preamble, para 9. 
400 Ibid, art. 2. By 6 December 2016, the Commission is also to prepare non-binding guidelines on the 
methods of the non-financial reporting; ibid, art. 4(1). 
401 Ibid, preamble para 10. 
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companies with respect to the use of conflict minerals, which has faced criticism especially 
due to the voluntary nature of the proposed duties.402
The initiatives taken within the UN and the EU show that corporate responsibility is 
gaining more attention not only among scholars and civil society actors but also among 
states. While no overnight solutions can be expected in this field where significant 
economic and political interests can easily slow down the reform process, the work under 
way shows that the regulatory gaps have been noticed, and that efforts are made to close 
them. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
402 Proposal 2014/0059 (COD) of 5 March 2014 for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council setting up a Union system for supply chain due diligence self-certification of responsible importers 
of tin, tantalum and tungsten, their ores, and gold originating in conflict-affected and high-risk areas [2014]. 
Also the MEPs have criticized the proposal and suggested that the proposed duties should be obligatory; see 
the European Parliament press release, ‘Conflict minerals: MEPs ask for mandatory certification of EU 
importers’ (20 May 2015), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-
room/20150513IPR55318/Conflict-minerals-MEPs-ask-for-mandatory-certification-of-EU-importers, last 
visited 28 February 2016. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS 
Under international law, transnational corporations remain somewhat odd creatures. 
Despite their ever-growing influence on global politics and economy, international law 
considers TNCs as “just another” group of non-state actors, whose operations are expected 
to be regulated primarily by national measures. Soft law initiatives have been established 
since the 1970s’ to persuade companies to commit themselves to socially responsible 
business and these initiatives have significantly contributed to the discussion on corporate 
responsibilities. However, the voluntary initiatives have also faced criticism, noting that 
they are not sufficient on their own to efficiently control corporate conduct. 
Under international law, the responsibility of states to control their corporate citizens is 
rather limited. Under customary norms on state responsibility, a state is responsible for the 
private operations of companies only if the operations were taken on its instructions, or 
under its direction or control. Even when the state is the owner of a company, the general 
separateness of the state and the company is respected, unless the corporate veil is 
considered to have been abused. It follows that states can only very rarely be held 
responsible for the actions of companies.  
Under international human rights law, states have the duty to protect individuals within 
their territory and their jurisdiction against human rights violations by private parties. Both 
international treaty bodies and regional human rights courts have affirmed this positive 
obligation in their jurisprudence, also in the context of corporate operations. The extent of 
state duty to protect is however significantly limited by the sphere of their jurisdiction. It 
follows that states are not obliged to control the activities of their corporate citizens 
abroad, or to hold them responsible for human rights violations taking place outside their 
jurisdiction. Despite recommendations by human rights treaty bodies on states to ensure 
that companies domiciled within their jurisdiction do not violate human rights when 
operating abroad, the states are not legally bound to follow such guidance. 
It thus falls on the host state of the corporate operations to ensure the protection of human 
rights within its territory. Not all states are, however, able or willing to fulfill this 
obligation. Especially in developing states, economic interests and the need to attract 
foreign investment are sometimes prioritized over human rights protection, which leads 
these states to neglect human rights protection. TNCs have been able to exploit the existing 
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weaknesses of the human rights system in their host states and to pressure states to either 
look the other way or to actively support abusive corporate operations. Under such 
circumstances, the ability of individuals to sue companies is very limited. While some 
states, especially those with a common law system, offer a forum for extraterritorial human 
rights cases, these regulatory systems have limitations as well. The jurisprudence of both 
US and English courts have shown that forum non conveniens and similar doctrines 
limiting the jurisdiction of national courts, as well as the difficulty of holding a parent 
company liable for its subsidiary’s actions, substantially restrict the prospect of successful 
claims in the courts of the home state for violations taken place during TNCs’ overseas 
operations.  
The loopholes in the regulation of companies have several consequences. While the 
impunity for violations is problematic on its own, I have focused on the impact on the right 
to remedy, because of the significance of this right to the effective protection of human 
rights. While states have a duty both under human rights treaties and customary 
international law to provide victims of human rights violations access to effective 
remedies, victims of human rights violations committed by TNCs are often unable to 
access remedies. Victims in these cases often encounter legal and practical barriers to 
remedies, both within the host state of the operations and within the home state of the 
TNC. The regulatory loopholes both on the international and national sphere further these 
barriers to remedy and therefore the unequal enjoyment of the right to remedy. Closing the 
loopholes – namely, holding the company itself liable for human rights violations on the 
international plane, and requiring the home state of the company to control its functions 
abroad – would help to at least partially remove the barriers to remedy.  
In my view, the best alternative to close the regulatory loopholes would be the 
establishment of an international legal framework through a multilateral treaty. 
International cooperation is needed to effectively regulate international actors and their 
international operations. International regulation would help to ensure that TNCs cannot 
escape responsibility by simply moving their operations or headquarters to another state. 
Victims of human rights violations would benefit from a legal framework acknowledging 
corporate responsibility and establishing the obligation of the company’s home state to 
provide access to remedies. Furthermore, a legal framework which would set down the 
legal obligations of companies would benefit the companies as well by clarifying their 
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duties, by eliminating the “free-rider” effect, and by helping those companies willing to 
exceed their legal duties to truly show that commitment. Finally, while concerns can be 
expressed of the content and the effectiveness of the possible future treaty, a legally 
binding document would be important due to its moral significance. A binding treaty 
would show the commitment of states to effectively protect human rights against 
infringements by all actors, and it would confirm that violations of international law will 
be responded to, regardless of the identity of the perpetrator. 
Judging from the recent developments on the issue, within international organizations, 
similar conclusions have been drawn within international organizations as well. Indeed, 
within the UN, the open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights, which was 
afforded a mandate to draft a legally binding instrument on corporations and human rights, 
is scheduled to hold its second session during this year. Time will tell whether an 
agreement will be reached on a treaty, but at least first steps have already been taken. 
Within the EU, the legal obligations of companies of a certain magnitude to report on the 
social impact of their operations will come into effect by the end of this year. This 
regulatory choice reflects the understanding within the EU member states of the need to 
require companies to pay attention on the social and environmental effects of their 
operations, both within the EU and elsewhere in the world.  
I will conclude with the words of the International Military Tribunal, which famously 
noted that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, 
and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of 
international law be enforced”.403
 
 The same idea on the need to effectively protect human 
rights in the light of new challenges is echoed in the discussion of the responsibility of 
transnational corporations. What has changed is the legal subject whose responsibility is in 
question; what remains is the need for the international legal order to face the reality of 
today. 
                                                 
403 Trials of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal, vol I (1947), p. 223. 
